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THE SLOWDOWN IN PRODUCTIVITY ADVANCES : A DYNAMIC EXPLANATION 
Burton H .  Klein 
INTRODUCTION 
How is the slowdown in the U.S. rate of productivity 
advance (see Figures I and II) to be explained? Quite obviously, 
before it can be explained the principal determinants of the rate 
of productivity advance need to be known. Many people believe 
that productivity advances are quite automatic, and were it not 
for such external factors as regulation and inflation or the 
declining growth rate there would be no slowdown .  But without 
knowing what determines the rate of productivity increase how 
can we be sure? 
Individual gains in productivity can, of course, come 
about in a variety of ways . For example, at any moment there 
are limits on the physical efficiency of machines as determined 
by the best available fuels and materials. One way of improving 
productivity consists of discovering ways to overcome these 
limits by either improving existing machines or discovering new 
ones . Another way of improving productivity consists of overcomin! 
difficult scaling problems, as had to be overcome in scaling down 
turbine engines before they could be used in airplanes or in 
scaling up the size of coal buring electric power plants to make 
them more efficient . Sometimes, increases in productivity are 
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FIGURE I 
Productivity in the Private Nonfarm Business Economy 
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obtained by finding ways to make machines either larger or 
smaller . But , because of constants in materials and in the laws 
of nature, it is impossible to scale at will . 
Almost invariably , if significant advances in technology 
are to result in important productivity gains they must be 
accompanied by organizational changes . Moreover , an organizational 
change can act as a triggering mechanism for advances in technology 
by permitting entrepreneurs to view improvements from a new 
perspective . For example , when the automobile industry organized 
its assembly lines in terms of a continuous production process 
rather than by type of  machine , ( e . g . , milling or boring) , entirely 
new possibilities , including automatic production lines , became 
apparen t .  
Although productivity advances can be triggered by 
either advances in technology or changes in organization , all 
of them involve in greater or lesser degree (depending upon the 
size of the particular advance) dealing with new circumstances . 
Therefor e ,  the slowdown can be looked upon as a measure of the 
declining ability of the U . S .  economy to deal with new circum-
s tances . In the past Britain has been justly regarded as the 
maj or industrial nation with less than adequate ability to deal 
with new circumstances , because its long-term performance in 
bringing about productivity gains has been the poorest . It is 
apparent , therefore , that by becoming less and less ab le to deal 
with new circumstances the U . S .  economy too is losing its 
vitality . 
Al ternatively , the worsening produc tivity performance of 
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the United States can be described as a decline in dynamic behavior . 
As used in this paper the term "dynamic" is defined as the ability 
to deal with new circumstances by generating new alternatives . 
For example , by developing the Model T Ford with farmers in mind , 
Henry Ford was engaged in dynamic behavior because he was dealing 
with both a new technology and a new type of customer . One 
difference between s tatic and dynamic economics is that , whereas 
in s tatic economics the entrepreneur takes both tas tes and 
alternatives as givens , in dynamic economics the entrepreneur 
constantly searches for loopholes in the law of supply and demand , 
that is , for ways to satisfy a latent demand or to satisfy an 
existing demand with better or less expensive alternatives . Thus 
we see that the productivity decline suggests a quite profound 
change in the American economy : a movement toward a less dynamic 
economy in which there is a decline in entrepreneurship . 
There are , of course,  economists who deny this . They 
believe that the productivity slowdown is a cyclical phenomenon 
rather than a longer-run change in the basic character of the 
American economy , arguing in support of this view that during the 
past several years the industries with the lowest growth rates 
are those exhibiting the poorest productivity performance .  How­
ever , if my argument is correc t ,  productivity gains represent a 
cause rather than a result of growth . To be sure , for productivity 
gains to be a cause of growth it is necessary to assume that 
there is price competition in the indus try concerned which leads 
to a search for ways to reduce costs , and , furthermore , that demand 
for the product in question is elastic . It is no accident that 
nearly all industries have shown the most growth when these 
conditions were fulfilled . 
A key difference between static and dynamic economics 
is that incentives play a more significant role in dynamic 
economics .  Dynamic economics contains not only positive 
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incentives in the form of the quest for higher profits ( the hidden 
hand argument invented by Adam Smith) , but also negative incentives 
in the form of a rival dislodging a firm from a well-established 
market (the so-called hidden foot) . Suppose that on the basis o f  
the record of  the past five years there is a 50-50 chance of  a 
firm being dislodged from an important market. In such an 
industry unfortunate surprises occur so often that they hardly 
can be regarded as unexpected . In such an industry both the 
hidden hand and the hidden foot play important roles . Profits 
will be larger the better entrepreneurs are able to guess about 
promising new markets . On the other hand , in such an industry 
the penalties involved in ignoring one ' s  competitors are very 
severe .  For example , a semiconductor firm seeking t o  make its 
profits as large as possible by making only a slightly different 
alternative than its competitors will face almost certain bank­
ruptcy . 
An even more fundamental difference between static and 
dynamic economics is that , while the former is completely deter­
ministic (with luck playing a zero role) , the latter is not . 
Modern dynamic theory is nondeterministic not only in the sense 
that luck is permitted to play a signif icant role in outcomes , 
but it also acknowledges the possibility of a positive relation­
ship between necessity and luck . The elements of necessity and 
luck are related because there is nothing like the hidden foot to 
motivate entrepreneurs to ask searching questions . To be sure , 
individuals differ greatly in their inquisitiveness and sense of 
adventure . But relatively few top executives are known for these 
qualities . Consequently , businesses are moved to search for new 
ideas only when pushed . 
While Schumpeter thought of an entrepreneur as a 
reckless gambler who plunged knowing that his chance of success 
was very small ,  this is not my picture . The entrepreneur cannot 
be so defined , because with chance playing such an important 
role he cannot hope to know the probability of bringing about a 
significant advance ;  only if the advance is relatively trivial can 
he make the required calculations . The principal difference 
between an entrepreneur and a manager is no t that the former is 
more reckless , but , rather , that while his relative advantage is 
in posing searching questions , the manager ' s  consists of answering 
well-defined questions . 
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Why does the rate of productivity advance eventually 
slow down? During the Victorian period in Britain the blame was 
placed mainly on the conviction that the world was running out o f  
ideas . Indeed , inasmuch as the Victorians regarded themselves as 
God's chosen people , there could be no other explanation.  However , 
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an eventual decline in dynamic behavior does no t indicate a 
drying up of economic opportunities , but , rather , it is a sign 
that as technologies mature the associated organizations tend to 
become less dynamic -- to feature managers rather than entrepreneurs . 
Moreover ,  due to an order of magnitude increase in the cost of 
entry , the process of establishing new firms slows down . In 
static economics easy entry o f  new firms performs the function 
of eliminating excess profits . But in dynamic economics new 
firms not only have a relat ive advantage in generating ideas , they 
have the effect of increasing the propensity to take risks in 
an entire industry ; that i s ,  when new firms enter an industry 
existing firms will consider ideas they would otherwise dismiss . 
Thus , without either the entry of new firms , real 
challenges from other industries ( for example , as the synthetic 
fibers industry challenged the cotton textile industry) , or 
challenges from foreign firms ( for example , as the U . S .  steel 
industry was challenged before it sought relief) , it can be 
predicted that the diversity o f  ideas generated in an industry 
will become narrower and narrower until finally an equilibrium 
is reached in which there are only trivial differences between 
products and rivalry is replaced by market sharing . To be sure , 
the engineers involved might like nothing better than to provoke 
genuine rivalry . However , an organization that has a minimal 
capability to deal with uncertainty is ill-prepared to start a 
conflict with its rivals . Hence a system of mutual deterrence 
develops , and very tight regulations are imposed on entrepreneurs 
lest they disturb the peace! And one of the maj or questions 
facing the nation is whether stagflation is too high a price to 
pay for this kind of peace . 
I .  THE ROLE OF TIGHT COST CONSTRAINTS IN STIMULATING ADVANCES 
IN PRODUCTIVITY 
A tight cost constraint can be defined as one which 
forces an entrepreneur to develop less costly alternatives than 
those now available . Such constraints are adopted because of 
the fear o f  the loss o f  a market to a rival . Not all firms will 
be equally successful in keeping costs within such constraints . 
In fact , we can hypothesize a wide range of outcomes of R&D 
proj ects : the larger the roles that both good and bad luck 
play , the wider will be the variance of outcomes . However ,  
if one rival turns out t o  b e  successful , h e  will have found a 
way to bring about a savings in either or both capital and labor 
inputs . In other words , he will have found a way to bring about 
an increase in total factor productivity . 
To be sure , there are other ways to reduce cos t s .  
Costs can b e  reduced b y  cutting wages or salaries o f  managerial 
officials . However ,  Keynes was not the first to discover that
wages are rigid in a downward direction . As early as the 1860s 
entrepreneurs in the British steel industry regarded improvements 
in productivity a better way to meet competition than reducing 
wages . 
Now it is true , of course , that in itself a tight cost 
constraint cannot generate a productivity advance . A tight cost 
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o r  quality constraint i s  simply a way o f  forcing oneself to ask , 
"Why cannot I do a better j ob than has been done before ? "  To 
answer this question the firm mus t search for ways to bring about 
discont inuous reductions in costs , which is to say , it must 
spend money on R&D . However, while a number of studies have 
shown R&D expenditures and productivity gains to be highly 
correlated , 1 it would be wrong to conclude that the more spent 
on R&D , the more rapid will be the rate of productivity gain . A 
high correlation can be expected only as long as firms in an 
industry impose the same degree o f  cost constraint on themselves . 
If due to a decline in rivalry firms impose a smaller degree of 
constraint on themselves , their R&D expenditures may or may not 
increase . R&D remains a good predictor of productivity advances 
only as long as the degree of cost constraint and ,  more basically , 
the degree of rivalry remain constant . 
Now that the relationship between productivity gains , 
tight cost cons traints , and R&D expenditures has been clarified , 
it is important to introduce two concepts that play central roles 
in dynamic theory . The first is unambiguous feedback . The 
second is ambiguous feedback . Unambiguous feedback is measured 
in terms of changes in market shares for various catagories of 
close substitute products (e . g . , intermediate automobiles , long-
range commercial aircraft) . If during the past five years , say , 
a 40 ''r 50 percent gain in market share· li;1s been typically 
associated with the introduction of a new produc t ,  then we can be 
quite sure that the hidden foot is providing other firms in the 
industry with a genuine incentive to take risks . Consequently it 
can be predicted that in such a situation searching questions 
will be asked and a high degree o f  constraint will be imposed on 
cost or quality . It also can be predicted that as feedback 
declines less searching questions will be asked and a lower 
degree of constraint will be imposed . In principle , of course , 
all firms could be equally successful in observing tight cost 
constraints -- with the result that market shares would remain 
constant . But s tatistically speaking , such outcomes are very 
unlikely . 
On the other hand -- ambiguous feedback consists o f  
all the hints and clues relevant for the generation o f  better 
alternatives . These hints can be gleaned from the firm's own 
activities to generate better alternatives , from those o f  its 
competitors , and by asking why particular "experiments" were not 
more successful. Although at times an R&D proj ect will be 
unsuccess ful it may contain some good ideas relevant to 
generating a more successful alternative . On the other hand , the 
entrepreneur can obtain important clues by observing the tech­
nology of another industry , from ideas contained in scienc e ,  or 
from having observed that some ingenuous ideas embodied in an 
unrelated product can be relevant for an entirely different 
application . In short , ambiguous feedback consists of good 
luck with which the entrepreneur might be favored , providing , 
of course ,  that he asks the right questions . 
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The relationship between the two types o f  feedback is 
s imply this: the higher the degree of unambiguous feedback , the 
tighter will be the cost constraint s ,  the greater will be the 
incentive to ask searching questions , and the greater will be 
the role played by luck . 
To illustrate these concepts and to further develop the 
argument several examples are herewith provided .
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The Model T Ford: The Model T Ford represented the fulfillment 
of Henry Ford's dream : a practical car for farmers . Having been 
brought up on a farm it is not surprising that he believed that 
farmers constituted an important s egment of the market for new 
automobiles . Other car manufacturers tailored their products for 
city dwellers . For the latter market two distinctly different 
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kinds o f  cars were developed : inexpensive but not durable runabouts 
ranging in price from $495 for a Sears & Roebuck runabout , to 
$650 for an Oldsmobile , to $750 for a Century Steam Car , to durable 
but more expensive automobiles ranging in price from $1 , 000 to well 
over $5 , 000 . In 1908 Buick , which produced a medium-priced car for 
$1 , 00 0 ,  was the top automob ile producer of the nation , enj oying 
25 percent of the market as compared with 10 percent for Ford . 
However , neither type o f  car was suitable for use by 
farmers . The inexpensive runabouts were not rugged enough; and 
the more rugged cars were too expensive . Therefore the constraint 
imposed upon the Model T involved a more rugged automob ile at 
more or less the same price as the inexpensive runabouts; and it 
helped make possible two important discoveries . The first 
consisted o f  Henry Ford ' s  observation o f  a French racing car 
constructed of vanadium steel that would permit the manufacture 
of a relatively lightweight rugged automobile . Other auto­
mob ile manufacturers had observed the same racing car , but 
apparently Ford ' s  constraint made this discovery seem more 
13 
relevant; the Model T was the first to use this type of construction . 
Though the first Model Ts were stronger than other low­
priced cars , they were not inexpensive . When introduced , the Model 
T cost $850 , and in 1909 , when the price went up to $9 5 0 ,  Ford ' s  
share o f  the market began to decline . Thereupon a figure of $600 
was adopted as his goal . To implement this goal a search for 
ideas to  rationalize and speed up production was initiated on a 
wide scale . One idea which emerged from the search , that of 
moving production lines , is generally credited to Clarence W. 
Avery who had seen the concept employed in a meat packing plant . 
He rationalized that if moving production lines can be used to 
disassemble carcasses , why not for assembling automobiles! 
Was it not a matter of luck that Avery happened to 
visit a meat packing plant? Of course it was . Luck plays an 
important role in all discoveries . On the other hand , were it not 
for the necessity of meeting tight cost and durab ility constraints 
there is not one chance in a hundred that the relevance of the 
process used in meat packing would have been appreciated . 
Thus Ford Motor Company created a loophole in the law o f  
supply and demand . I say "loophole" for two reasons . In the first 
place , if it is assumed that the demand of farmers for such an 
automobile were known , then it is difficult to explain why 
several automobile makers did not simultaneously develop a 
similar car . On the other hand , Henry Ford obviously did not 
repeal the law o f  supply o f  demand , because after the Model T 
was developed the Ford Motor Company faced a downward sloping 
demand curve . The assumption that entrepreneurs can create 
loopholes in demand and/or supply conditions does no t ,  of course , 
imply any disrespect for the classical law of supply and demand . 
On the contrary , the assumption of loopholes is needed to protect 
it . 
While no one can say to what extent Henry Ford accep ted 
the risk o f  developing a new kind o f  automobile because of fear 
of his rivals , it is nonetheless true that as o f  1908 at least 
six automobile manufacturers which had enjoyed more than 10 per­
cent of the market had already gone out of business .  So in this 
kind of environment there was a big risk involved in making an 
automob ile only marginally different from that o f  a competitor; 
in short , it was an environment in which it paid to be different . 
One of the big debates in economics is to what extent 
a large market was responsible for the rapid economic development 
of the United State s .  There can be n o  question that a large 
market provides a country with an important potential advantage . 
But with a hidden hand alone , there is no assurance whatsoever 
that this potential will be rapidly exp loited . On the contrary , 
if firms had taken their demand conditions as a given the 
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automobile never would have been developed . Nevertheless ,  a 
large and diverse market provides one important advantage . It 
helps to insure that entrepreneurs will come from different 
backgrounds ,  and they wil l ,  therefore , think differently about 
demand conditions . In other words , the advantage is a s tatistical 
advantage . In European countries the probability was smaller 
that an automob ile entrepreneur would come from a farm, and would , 
therefore , think like a farmer . 
The DC-2 and DC-3 Commercial Airplanes : During the 1930s , more 
than one-half of total airline company costs were represented by 
airliner operating costs (including depreciation) . And shortly 
after the Air Mail Act of 1934 , which drastically curtailed 
subsidies to the airlines , the airline companies took the 
initiative by pressing for more economical airliners .  In 
particular , Trans-World Airlines asked several firms , including 
Douglas , to enter a design competition for an airplane whose 
performance would be equivalent to that o f  the recently developed 
Boeing 247 -- but whos e  costs would be s ignificantly lower . 
Although a two-engine airplane was generally regarded as a simpler 
and more economical concept than the trimotor airplanes developed 
during the late 1920s , because of FAA safety regulations the plane 
was required to fly on a single engine . Neither of Douglas ' 
competitors at that time (Sikorsky and General Aviation) were 
willing to risk development of a two-engine design . That a risk 
was involved is indicated by the fact that the DC-2 turned out to 
15 
be 30 percent overweight and could no t have met its performance 
requirement had it not been for the ability of the people in 
charge to quickly reorient the program to take advantage of the 
recently developed variable-pitch propeller and a more powerful 
engin e .  Thus , luck also played an important role here . However, 
later we shall see that conducting R&D programs to take advantage 
of good luck, and to minimize the consequences of bad luck , 
constitutes the essence of dynamic efficiency . 
Now it is true , of course , that as of the time there 
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was no airplane in direct competition with the DC-2 (only somewhat 
later did Lockheed develop a close competitor) . However ,  prior 
to the time of the DC-1 and the DC-2 (the production version of 
the DC-1) , Douglas had never developed a commercial airplane . 
S o ,  as far as the commercial market was concerned Douglas was a 
newcomer . If the Douglas Company were to become an important 
factor in the commercial business it obviously had an incentive 
to take risks . (Trying to get into the commercial market by 
merely developing another version o f  the trimotor airplane would 
have undoubtedly involved even greater risk . )  In his Wilbur 
Wright Memorial Lecture , Arthur Raymond who not only was on the 
team that developed the DC-1 and the DC-2 , but later was in charge 
of the DC-3 program , indicated that a new entrant to a market 
has a somewhat different point o f  view from that o f  a well­
established firm : 
What is my competitor doing? Is he so entrenched that it 
will be extremely difficult , if not impossible,  to make 
headway against him? On the other hand , has he been 
established in the field so long that he is perhaps growing 
complacent? Should he have brought out a new model some 
time ago and failed to do so , thus giving me an opening?3 
Although the DC-2 resulted in a 25 percent reduction in 
operating costs (measured in real terms) below those achieved 
with the trimotor airplanes , and Lockheed ' s  L-10 (similar in 
design to the DC-2) resulted in an additional savings in operating 
costs , this was not enough . Even with more economical airliners 
the maj or airlines were still operating at a loss . The next 
step was also taken by airline companies when William Littlewood , 
Chief Engineer for American Airlines , proposed that larger engines 
be utilized to develop an airplane that could carry twenty-four 
instead of fourteen passengers . As a consequence ,  the DC-3 
was developed as a stretched version of the DC-2 ; and it resulted 
in bringing down seat-mile operating costs from 6 . 8  to 3 . 3  
cents -- or by 5 0  percent . 
In one important respect the development of commercial 
aircraft dif fered from that of automobiles . Its development was 
supported by research directly undertaken by the government (in 
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) laboratories) 
and that sponsored by the universities . For example, Arthur L .  
Klein , o f  the California Institute o f  Technology , directly 
contributed to the development of the DC-2 by discovering a way 
to reduce drag that was previously unknown to designers of  low-
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wing monoplanes . However,  both the NACA and university laboratories 
were highly responsive to the need to reduce costs . 
Development of the Prototype for the Boeing 707: Boeing's 
experience in developing the B-47 bomber cer tainly gave it an 
advantage when it came to developing commercial j ets . Yet , 
bombers and commercial airplanes are developed with entirely 
different cost constraints ; that is , in the case of military 
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airplanes the primary constraint is the performance requirement , 
and cost is a secondary consideration. Boeing learned this the 
hard way when it developed the Stratocruiser airplane as a 
modification of the B-29 bomber;  and , although it might have been 
success ful if delivered to the airlines before the DC-6 , it was 
not .  Consequently , relatively high operating costs , as compared 
with the DC-6 , represented the main reason why , when unable to 
sell enough airplanes to recoup its initial investment , Boeing 
lost about fifty million dollars . 
As a resul t ,  Boeing officials were determined to go 
about the development of a commercial j et in a manner that would 
not resul t in a repetition of the Stratocruiser experience . The 
principal question about the economics of the airplane arose from 
the fact that CAA certification requirements for commercial jet 
aircraft were not yet established . Moreover , the airplane ' s  
stalling speed directly affected its economics . The higher the 
stalling speed , the lower would be the certifiable weight , and 
the poorer would be the economic characteristics of the airplane 
inasmuch as the payload would be smaller and longer runways would 
be required . Further , relatively small errors in estimating the 
stalling speed could result in relatively large errors in 
estimating costs . Therefore , an experimental airplane was 
required to provide more accurate measurements .  
A cost constraint was adopted which required a commercial 
j et to have no larger operating costs than piston-engine commercial 
aircraft .  With company funds Boeing undertook the development of  
an experimental airplane that would serve as a proto type for 
both a commercial j et and an Air Force tanker . As it turned 
out , the 707 had lower operating costs than either the DC-7 or 
the Lockheed-developed turboprop airliner . However , relatively 
few people in the industry anticipated that the j et would have 
this advantage . 
The Batch Process for Producing Trans istors : Originally , 
transistors were regarded as subs titutes for vacuum tubes . 
Although a half-dozen large receiving tube companies went into 
the transistor bus iness , by the late 1950s Texas Instruments 
occupied the same position in the semiconductor industry as did 
Buick when challenged by Ford . 
The s tory of the challenge to Texas Instrument ' s  
market leadership began in Shockley Laboratories which was 
established as a wholly owned s ubsidiary of Beckman Instruments 
in the mid 1950s . (Along with John Bardeen and Walter Brattain , 
William Shockley received the Nobel Prize for the discovery of 
the transistor . )  Shockley Laboratories was s taffed mainly by a 
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group of  young scientists and engineers recruited from univers ities . 
However , shortly after the company was founded a serious disagree­
ment arose between Shockley and his staf f .  According to reliable 
sources, the disagreement arose not over whether the transistor 
would have uses other than as a replacement for the vacuum tub e ,  
but , rather,  how vis ionary i t  paid t o  be given the current status 
of the technology . While Shockley was thinking in terms of ideas 
which might pay off ten or twenty years later, eight of the 
people he had hired believed that they had an idea which would 
pay off in about six months . 
As is the case with many important discoveries , the 
dissidents ' concept was relatively s imple . The manner by which 
transistors were being produced , they reasoned , was analogous to 
producing pos tage stamps one at a time . Why no t produce sheets o f ,  
say , 10 , 000 stamps - - and later cut the sheets into individual 
stamps?  Their motivation , however , was not so much to reduce 
the cost as it was to increase the performance of transistors at 
the same cost . They reasoned that if transistors with an order of  
magnitude improvement in performance could be produced at no more 
than what trans istors currently cos t ,  there would be additional 
markets for semiconduc tors -- most imnunediately in the computer 
industry .  
Not able t o  persuade Shockley , the young entrepreneurs 
managed to convince Fairchild Camera and Ins trument to finance 
the development of the Planar process for eighteen months . Fair­
child in return received an option to buy the firm, which it later 
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exercised . 
This , however , is not the end of the story . If many 
trans istors can be produced in one operation , why disassemble 
them to create comp lete circuits? Why no t make many transistors 
and a complete circuit in one operation? This thinking eventually 
led to the drastic decline in the price of integrated circuits 
(more than 90 percent between 196 3  and 1968) in which Fairchild 
played a primary role . 
However , it is no accident that the evolution of semi-
conductors took this particular form . Had entrepreneurs continued 
to think in terms of producing s emiconductors one at a time the 
idea of producing an inexpensive integrated circuit probably would 
not have occurred to them . So a tight quality and cost constraint 
not only led to one cost reducing discovery (the Planar transistor 
which made batch production possible) , it also helped speed up 
the entire evolution of the technology . The same process has 
occurred in many other industries . 
The development of transistors was but another case 
s imilar to that of the Model T Ford . By assuming that the quality 
elasticity of demand would be high , the people who developed the 
batch were able to discover a loophole in the law of supply and 
demand . (If the market po tential and the means of achieving it 
were well known , why did not many firms do likewise?) Again it 
was fortunate that not all people in the industry had the same 
probability estimates with respect to demand conditions , for if 
all firms had acted upon the assumption that the semiconductor 
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was merely a replacement for vacuum tubes the real potentialities 
of  the technology would never have become known . 
Movements Away from the Center o f  a Dis tribution : The above 
examples provide good illus trat ions of dynamic processes : 
processes that result in steady reductions in cos t ,  steady 
improvements in quality , or both . The two principal character-
istics of  such processes are these .  I n  the first place , the 
alternatives are not becoming more and more alike -- there is no 
movement toward the center of a distribution . On the contrary , 
highly discontinuous changes can be observed that change the 
shape of the distribution . Secondly , they are irreversible 
changes -- irrevers ible because they change history . After the 
development of the Model T the world no longer looked the same 
either to automobile makers or to farmers ; their subjective 
probability distributions had changed . 
This is not to say , of cours e ,  that the alternatives 
always changed in the way predicted by dynamic theory . In fac t ,  
i n  a famous article written i n  1929 , Harold Hotelling lamented 
about a world in which he observed not only trivial differences 
between products , but also trivial differences between poli tical 
parties .
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On the basis of  his observations he developed a model 
to explain such convergence toward the center of a distribution: 
a model tha� has had a pro found effect on both economics and 
polit ical science . The reason for calling the Hotelling model 
to the reader ' s  attention is to highlight the fact that dynamic 
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processes involving feedback are entirely different from those 
which occur in his model ( in which , as will be seen , there is 
no feedback) . 
Alternatives move away from the center of a distribution 
when an industry generates a good deal of  feedback . When large 
changes in market shares hinge on success in developing a new 
product , entrepreneurs are likely to impose constraints upon 
themselves that result in the generation of entirely new alter-
natives . In the process the probability distributions move to 
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the left if  the advance takes the form of  cost-reducing discoveries , 
or to the right if they take the form of quality improving 
discoveries . 
The general picture associated with a series of cost-
reducing discoveries is as shown in Figure III . It is assumed 
that within each period there are hypotheses which will result in 
both relatively inexpensive and expensive alternatives : hence , 
the probability distributio n .  But the entrepreneur does not know 
where on the distribution a particular hypo thesis will fal l .  An 
idea that might seem to lie on the extreme left of  the diagram 
when development is s tarted can end on the extreme right side when 
development is completed . How widely the entrepreneur searches 
will depend on the amount of feedback generated . When large 
changes in market shares occur in an indus try , the entrepreneur 
obviously has an incentive to search more widely . On the other 
hand , when there is no pressure on him , he is likely to search in 
the region of A .  More specifically , h e  will search until an 
alternative is found that corresponds with his belief with respect 
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to the middle of the distribution ; then he will stop . This search 
pattern is associated with an industry that has a hidden hand but 
no hidden foot , that is, an industry in which changes in market 
shares are very small . On the other hand , a small degree of 
rivalry will result in narrow search and a modest degree o f  move-
ment away from the center of the distribution . 
Finally , asstnlle that competitive pressures force firms 
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to set their cost limits at C -- beyond the tail of  the distributio n .  
Of course ,  n o t  a l l  firms i n  the industry will b e  equally 
successful in keeping within the constraint . But on the assumption 
that one is successful the distributions will move to the left 
as is shown on the diagram , with the mos t successful proj ect 
appearing at the middle of  the next distribution . I say 
"middle , "  because on the basis of his knowledge o f  history the 
entrepreneur can be expected to know that in the next generation 
of alternatives some will turn out to be less successful than the 
most successful alternative developed during the previous period . 
In other words , he knows that the possibility o f  both good and 
bad luck must be acknowledged . 
It is important to keep in mind , however , that if the 
entrepreneur hopes to make history he must not assume that he 
knows the probability that a particular hypothesis will turn out 
to be successful . To be sure , the entrepreneur will want to make 
some asstnllptions with respect to demand conditions (although if 
he hopes to make as much money as possible he must never assume 
complete knowledge of the elasticity of demand) .5 Furthermore , 
he must ask himself some penetrating questions , e . g . , why cannot 
an alternative be developed to have a 30 or 40 percent advantage 
over existing alternatives ?  But never must the entrepreneur 
assume that he knows how to bring about a discontinuous advance ; 
for if he thinks he knows the answers (even in probabalistic 
terms ) his most precious potential asset will be lost -- his luck. 
As I argued at some length in my book Dynamic Economics ,  a 
Bayesian entrepreneur simply is unab le to deal with discontinuous 
change . 6 He cannot ,  because to make history it is necessary to 
generate entirely new hypotheses -- generating a successful new 
alternative typically involves becoming married to and divorced 
from a succession of hypotheses . Typically , unexpected problems 
come up , and new questions must be raised . 
Finally , what prerequisite mental attitudes are needed 
in order to be good at asking searching ques tions ? In whatever 
field they may happen to b e ,  entrepreneurs must adopt for their 
operational code , "at close range none of my previous beliefs or 
theories can be true -- because they are based on probability 
dis tributions obtained from previous experiments or experiences . "  
This i s  the very essence o f  looking upon an entrepreneur as an 
open system -- a mind that can interact with its environment to 
change both its ideas and its environment . However , for the 
interaction to be successful a good deal o f  luck is invariably 
involved .  
It i s  true , of  course , that the extent t o  which people 
are willing to ask themselves penetrating questions is a matter of 
degree rather than kind ; and for this reason people who ask more 
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or less penetrating questions can be described in terms of their 
degree o f  openness .  From this point o f  view, the difference 
between an entrepreneur and a manager is that the former possesses 
a higher degree o f  openness ; that is, he is less willing to assume 
there are sacred truths . 
II . CONDITIONS FOR RAPID PROGRESS IN IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY 
The overview of the role of dynamic theory in explaining 
product ivity advances provided in Section I left out of account 
three important topics . The first is the kind of organization 
appropriate for bringing about rapid advances, whether productivity 
gains are measured in terms of reductions in costs or improvements 
in quality . In the previous discussion it was implicitly assumed 
that the entrepreneur was the head of the organization . But an 
entrepreneurial organization contains dozens of entrepreneurs -­
dozens of people good at asking questions. While the founders of 
new firms are invariably the chief question raisers, in older 
firms this function is not necessarily exercised by the top 
management .  The s econd important topic to be discussed is dynamic 
efficiency, which is defined as maximizing the probability o f  
recognizing good luck while minimizing the consequences o f  bad 
luck. Finally it is necessary to explain why , if an industry is 
to continue to generate a large amount of feedback, the more or 
less continuous entry o f  new firms is require d .  
The basic aim of dynamic theory is, o f  course, t o  develop 
testable propositions . To do this a mathematical model is 
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required which i s  neither completely stochastic nor completely 
deterministic , inasmuch as it recognizes the relationship between 
necessity and chance . Work on this model has only begun . How­
ever , to prevent the mathematics from mastering the economics 
it is necessary to begin with not only economic concepts that can 
be put in mathematical form, but also some testable proposit ions 
(i . e . , definite statements which can be shown to be wrong) ; such 
propositions will be discussed in the concluding part of this 
section . 
The Role of Organization and Internal Incentives: To possess a 
high degree of openness an organization must be able to engage in 
the unconstrained interactions necessary to multiply the 
possibilities of good luck . It must not only be staffed with 
imaginative and inquisitive people , it must be highly interactive 
both within and with the external world -- so interac tive that 
the precise authorship of particular discoveries is always in 
dispute . Obviously the more interactive an organization , the 
greater the possib ility for encountering good luck . An entre­
preneur may be good at asking questions , but if he always inter­
acts with the same people the probability of gaining new insights 
is most unl ikely . As for outside interactions , among others , 
unive rsit ies are very important potential sources of new ideas . 
It is no accident that such interactions were at their peak when 
most rapid progress was being made in the development of the 
commercial airplane , new pharmaceuticals, and computers . 
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Finally , and most important , organizations cannot long 
remain dynamic if they do not interact with their customers to 
understand their real prob lems . In one company whose products 
have helped bring about productivity gains in several indus tries , 
the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company , the key organi-
zational "invention" that played a very important role in its 
success consisted of having its salesmen , who previously only 
interacted with distributors , call upon the firms who actually 
used their newly developed sandpaper to acquire firsthand 
information about users ' problems . Subsequently a research and 
development organization was set up to see what might be done to 
make the product more useful . In turn , this activity resulted in 
the development o f  completely new products . 
How can the openness of organizations be measured? 
There are several ways . One is as follows : Suppose we collect 
information concerning an R&D department ' s  telephone calls to 
find out who calls whom for a period of , say , three months . On 
the basis of this information we can predict the pattern of 
connnunications for the following three months . If our pre,
are very good we can be quite certain that the organization 
possesses a low degree of openness . On the other hand , the 
poorer the predictions that can be made ( the greater is the 
degree of randomness in the calls) , the greater is the degree o f  
openness of the department .  
Quite as important as the degree o f  openness is the 
internal structure of incentives as they relate to getting ahead 
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in the organization . In general , in dynamic firms the correlation 
between seniority and salary is low -- with salary not dependent 
on position in the administrative hierarchy . As an ext reme case , 
there was one chemical company during the 1950s in which twelve 
highly creative chemists earned more money than the Chairman of 
the Board . In more s tatic organizations not only does salary 
depend on administrative position , but there is o ften a sys tem 
of fringe benefits which makes leaving the company become more 
and more expensive . In other words , instead of providing 
positive incentives for risk-taking ,  the incentives are bet ter 
designed to insure obedience . 
Dynamic Efficiency: Roughly speaking , my concept of dynamic 
efficiency is the same a� Harvey Leibens tein ' s  concept of "X-
efficiency , "  that is , it is the efficiency associated with pro-
ducing a given output with fewer inputs . 7 However , while 
Leibenstein agrees that competition plays an indispensable 
role in promoting dynamic efficiency , he does not discuss what 
kind of behavior is involved ,  nor how it differs from that 
involved in promoting s tatic efficiency . 
The key idea in s tatic efficiency is to make good use 
of existing knowledge . And , as Adam Smith long ago pointed out 
in his famous discussion of a pin mill , the main idea in static 
efficiency is specialization ; that is , larger tasks are broken 
down into smaller and smaller tasks . The organizational corollary 
associated with static efficiency is not a firm with a high 
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degree of openness :  on the contrary , the pursuit o f  static 
efficiency inevitably drives organizations to a lower and lower 
degree of openness .  
By contrast ,  dynamic efficiency involves undertaking 
research and development and production activities so as to 
maximize the likelihood of good luck and minimize the consequences 
of bad luck . The first requirement for a high degree of dynamic 
efficiency , therefore , is highly interactive organizations to 
multiply the poss ibilities of good luck . Second , it is 
imperative to design exploratory development proj ects so knowledge 
can be obtained early in development programs at relatively small 
cos t .  Entrepreneurs know from previous experiences that to 
develop satisfactory alternatives to embody significant advances 
they will have to become married to and divorced from a succession 
of hypothese s .  As creative engineers are fond of  making the 
point: "It is not what you do not know that can kill you -- it 
is what you think you know . "  Hence , the necessity to explore 
new concepts as quickly and inexpensively as possible . 
Third , dynamic efficiency requires that proj ects be 
undertaken in a manner that makes relatively easy the incorporation 
of new knowledge . For example, not only a variable pitch propeller 
and a new engine saved the DC-3 when it could not meet its 
performance requirements , its design made relatively easy the 
changing of engines . To be sure , performance of the DC-3 could 
have been increased somewhat by closely opt imizing the design for 
a particular engine -- but to do that would have made the 
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incorporation of  new technological ingredients more difficult . 
Because "saving time" often makes necessary the undertaking of  
production activities before all uncertainties are eliminated , 
dynamic efficiency also requires that tooling be undertaken to 
make relatively inexpens ive the incorporation o f  changes. When 
introducing new types of  commercial airplanes or pharmaceuticals 
firms do not tool to minimize production costs , but , rather, to 
minimize the cost of changes . 
That rational people behave differently in a world of  
"strong" uncertainties was ,  of  course , recognized long ago by 
Keynes when he pointed out that one reason for holding money was 
to be better prepared to deal with "s trong uncertainties " ; that 
is , by holding money one is bet ter prepared to take quick 
advantage of good luck and minimize the possibility of bad luck . 
But apparently he did not recognize that the same argument holds 
with respect to increasing the marginal efficiency of capital . 
In a world in which knowledge changes the entrepreneur must be 
suffic iently flexible in planning so that it will be relatively 
easy to incorporate either new knowledge or newly recognized 
luck into his plans . 
Unfortunately , however ,  there is a trade-off between 
static and dynamic efficiency for the reason that organizations 
cannot be simultaneously optimized for low and high degrees of  
openness . A highly informal organization capable of responding 
quickly to new conditions is not ideal for managing well-defined 
tasks . For example , from the point of view of an automobile 
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manufacturer , firms in the semiconductor industry would be 
described as chaotic . Conversely , consider the static organi-
zations described by Richard M .  Cyert and James G. March in their 
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Behavioral Theory of the Firm : an organization in which not only 
are primary tasks subdivided into smaller and smaller sub-tasks 
and the pattern of corrununications is almost entirely up and 
down echelons , but search is very narrow: if such an organization 
were involved ,  the computer used in Cyert ' s  and March's simulation 
models could never have been developed .  
As a consequence o f  the trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency the cost of experimentation skyrockets as 
organizations become more complex and more production oriented . 
For example , it was for this reason that the Ford Motor Company 
contracted with the Honda Corporation to set up a small shop at 
Ford where Japanese engineers worked on the development of  a 
statified charge engine . As a Ford engineer explained it to me : 
"While Honda still employs the same type of organization we used 
to develop the Model T ,  at Ford today our organization is too 
complex to undertake such a task inexpensively . "  Apparently 
engineers at the Ford Motor Company are not convinced about 
Galbraith ' s  argument that making maj or advances requires massive 
organizations . 
The trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency 
also can be observed in the declining ability of American industry 
to engage in foreign competition . This trend cannot be blamed 
upon the U . S .  disadvantage in terms of scale economies or vertical 
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integration , that is , on a disadvantage in static efficiency . 
In terms of static efficiency we are still well ahead of the other 
industrialized countries . The problem ,  rather , is that organi-
zations optimized for a high degree of static e ffic iency are 
incapable of highly flexible responses . In fact , as compared 
with the s teel industry , the Defense Department may be regarded 
as a relatively flexible instrument .  
Thus , economists who continue to revere scale economies 
and vertical integration are worshipping monuments of the past . 
The exploitation of such economies involves massive organizations 
with a minimal ability to respond to new circumstances . By 
contras t ,  from the standpoint of  dynamic efficiency small is to 
be regarded as beautiful . 
The Role of New Entrants into an Industry: There is an abundance 
of evidence that entrants into an industry -- whether the meat 
packing , automobile ,  aircraft engine , radio , or the semiconductor 
industries -- have played an indispensable role in maintaining 
the dynamism of the industry in question . Because new firms 
have great incentive to be different , they create rivalry which 
increases the incentive to take risks in the entire industry . 
Existing f irms become fairly quick to adopt ideas which they 
earlier would have dismissed . Or to put the same point in another 
way , the principal cause of the railroad cartels breaking down 
again and again during the nineteenth century was the entrance 
of new firms into the industry . 9 
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Contrary to common wisdom, railroad companies desired regulation 
not because the government was more efficient in running a cartel, 
but because regulation was needed to put an end to the entry of 
unobedient new firms. 
To be sure, I am not the first to point out the role 
of new firms in providing an industry with a greater incentive 
to engage in risk-taking. For example, the same point is made 
in F. M. Scherer's book, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance.
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However, while it is true that the incentives of 
new firms differ from those of well-established· firms, the 
former have an even more profound advantage inasmuch as they can 
exhibit a greater degree of dynamic efficiency. 
On the basis of the concepts discussed in the previous 
two sections, the reasons for their relative advantage in dynamic 
efficiency should be fairly apparent. If a firm is to exploit 
the discoveries it has already made, it is almost inevitably 
driven to a higher degree of organization; that is, it becomes 
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l�ss interactive and, as such, possesses a lower degree of openness. 
As in writing a book, there must be an end to generating new ideas 
if you hope to finish it; like it or not, you must impose a 
high degree of organization on yourself. Moreover, it should be 
kept in mind that once a firm is driven to a higher degree of 
organization the reference scales of its members change; that is, 
an advance of a particular size seems larger than before. For 
example, when executives of the Ford Motor Company describe the 
Mustang as a fundamental breakthrough they are describing an 
organization whose reference scale is not as large as it was in 
1908. Or, to put the same point in psychological terms, when 
organizations become more and more structured, the tolerance of 
ambiguity of their members is likely to decline to the point 
that small differences appear to be large differences. 
By contrast, new firms tend to be rather informally 
organized; and typically their members have not known each other 
very long. Indeed, in some cases the key ideas are roughly 
formulated even before the firm is established. Moreover, after 
the organization is established, internal competition mainly 
takes the form of competition in ideas. Only later does 
position in the organizational hierarchy become the chief form 
of competition. In short, this kind of environment is ideal for 
luck to play an important role; and the advantage of new firms 
is mainly one of openness. Moreover, successful new firms (and 
many of them are not successful) pay a good deal of attention to 
understanding the real problems of their customers. It is only 
in well-established firms in which the R&D process has become 
highly routinized that inventiveness for its own sake becomes the 
order of the day. 
To be sure, there are exceptions to the rule that as a 
firm exploits its discoveries its openness declines. Consider, 
for example, the field of communications satellites. Each new 
generation of communications satellites contains some very 
significant advances. The people who bring about these advances 
describe their jobs as discovering loopholes in the laws of 
nature. However, to be successful a new communications satellite 
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must not only embody some marve lous new ideas , it must also be a 
highly reliable system .  Consequently , sooner o r  later everyone on 
the team must stop being an entrepreneur and do his best at 
being a manager . In other words , precisely the same thing happens 
in this field of development as happens in others . The difference 
is s imply that once the satellites are in orbit there is no way 
to bring about further improvements . Consequently , the teams 
are disbanded and once again managers b ecome entrepreneurs . 
There are , o f  course , in other industries a few far­
sighted research managers who operate in much the same way . 
But , statis tically speakin g ,  these exceptions seem to be quite 
unimportant . Typically , if an entrepreneur becomes a manager , 
say , for a period of three years , he seldom reverts to the status 
of  an entrepreneur . 
There are , of course ,  other advantages of a new firm . 
As was already noted , the cost o f  experimentation is likely to be 
a good deal lower . By no t having a well-established techno­
structure a new firm is less likely to bring about discoveries 
resulting in their own destruction . Nor need relatively newly 
established firms feel as constrained as well-established firms 
when making discoveries that will make highly specialized 
facilities obsolete . 
In summary , new firms p lay a double function . They 
not only increase the incentives to take risks in an industry as 
whole ; they keep the openness of the well-established firms from 
declining . Shrinkages in reference scales of well-es tablished 
firms are prevented by the fact that as long as new firms 
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continue L u  en L er an indus try the longer e s t a b l ished ones must 
be constantly prepared for surprises . To be sure , this does not 
apply to all new firms inasmuch as some are content to find 
comfortable niches . The previous discussion was concerned with 
firms that aspire to become maj or factors in an indus try . 
Toward a Dynamic Model : Now that we have discussed the principal 
ingredients of dynamic theory , I will turn to the task of  
formulating a predic tive theory . To do this it will be useful to 
make explicit two concepts that were implied in the previous 
discus sion : Types I and II uncertainties .  
Type I uncertainty implies risks for firms , and 
inasmuch as they cannot buy insurance to protect  themselves from 
such risks , it provides an incentive to deal with them. And , as 
already indicated , inso far as Type I uncertainty arises from 
competitive risks , it is measured by the degree of change in 
market share s .  Consider , firs t ,  the case in which firms are 
already insured against competitive risks the case of a perfect 
cartel in which changes in market shares occur within very narrow 
limit s .  There are only trivial differences between products , and 
when products are changed , the changes are trivial . In such a 
s ituation firms can make nearly perfect predictions of each 
other ' s  products ; and there is a negligible degree of Type I 
uncertainty , because there is a negligible amount of feedback . 
But , as firms take greater and greater risks , changes in market 
shares will become greater and greater ; and as more feedback is 
generated Type I uncertainty increases . It should be kept in 
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mind , however , that from a somewhat different point of view a 
high degree of uncertainty does not necessarily imply real 
surprises . Assume that every three or four years one or another 
firm in the industry generates a s ignificant discovery . In this 
case the firms in the industry cannot predict each others ' 
products , but they can predict a surprise ! However , they are not 
necessarily startling from the point of view of insiders whose 
reference scale has made them accustomed to highly discontinuous 
changes . Thus , from the point o f  view o f  an industry unaccustomed 
to dealing with the unexpected , even a relatively small deviation 
from the "normal" will be regarded as surprising . For example , 
when in the successive breakdowns of the railroad cartels during 
the 1880s rates fell by as much as 20 percent , the railroad 
companies described this as a "price war . "  On the other hand , in 
the commercial aircraft industry during the 1930s or in the 
semiconductor industry until fairly recently where a 20 percent 
advance was regarded as an incremental improvement , if a firm ' s  
rivals behaved like the railroads that would not have been re-
garded as war ; it would have been regarded as peace ! 
The main point to keep in mind is that when the hidden 
foot is doing a good j ob of keeping Type I uncertainty high , it 
operates quite as automatically as the hidden hand . For example , 
as Figure IV shows , progres s in reducing the operating costs 
(including depreciation) of  commercial airliners was so smooth 
that it almost seems to have been preordained . Moreover , as the 
Figure shows , during the period between 1925 and 1940 , when 
progress was most rapid , it was also most unpredictable , because 
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both good and bad luck played an important role in outcomes . 
During that period the difference between the high and low cost 
alternatives of the alternatives developed each year averaged 
over 50 percent . 
After World War II there was a definite retardation in 
the rate of progress . This , however , is not difficult to 
explain . In the first place , rate regulation of the airplane 
companies (which was established in the late 1930s) had the 
effect of taking the pressure to reduce costs off the aircraft 
developers . In the second p lace , during the 1930s entry of new 
firms into the industry came to a stands til l .  Indeed , one of  the 
most important reasons for deregulating the airline industry is 
that as a consequence of a greater degree of rate competition 
aircraft companies will find themselves under more pressure to 
reduce costs . 
Another way to measure Type I uncertainty is in terms 
of the probability of a good or bad surpris e .  Table I shows 
the fate of 26 maj or automobile firms during the period 1903 to 
1921 , and 31 semiconductor firms during the period 1957 to 1975 . 
It should be noted that of those automobile and semiconductor 
firms in the top five not all remained so for the entire period 
only one automobile company and one semiconductor company held 
that distinction . The principal difference between the two 
industries with respect to downfalls is that in the automobile 
industry they were more severe . In the automobile industry all 
of  the unpleasant surprises invo lved either dropping to 10th
place or going out of  business . On the othe� hand , in the case 
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TABLE I 
FATE OF 26 MAJOR AUTOMOBILE FIRMS 
1903-1924 
Never fell from top 5 
Fell from top 5 
Rose into top 5 
Remained minor entities 
Source : Dynamic Economics , p .  100 . 
3 firms 
6 firms 
2 firms 
15 firms 
FATE OF 31 SEMICONDUCTOR FIRMS 
1957-1975 
Never fell from top 5 
Fell from top 5 
Rose into top 5 
Remained minor entities 
3 firms 
5 firms 
1 firm 
22 firms 
Source:  The Semiconductor Indus try :  A Survey of Structure , 
Conduct and Performance , January 19 7 7 ,  p .  2 3 .  
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of the semiconductor industry a typical downfall involved some­
thing like a 50 percent decline in a firm ' s  share of  the market . 
Of the automobile firms who made it into the top ranks or who 
remained in the top ranks , only one was in business as early as 
1903 , two entered the field in 1916 , and two in 1915 . In the 
semiconductor industry , too , newcomers played much the same role . 
It should be apparent from these data that the 
successful princes in modern industry cannot be defined as firms 
that , if they started out by being lucky , spent more on R&D , 
thereby increasing the probability of further success . Rather , 
like many of Machiavelli ' s  princes , many of the modern princes 
met their downfall because they could not adapt to new 
circumstances . 
Finally , it should be pointed out that competition from 
other industries or from foreign firms can play an important 
role in generating feedback for an industry and , hence , in making 
Type I uncertainty reasonably high . Moreover , it should also be 
pointed out that firms can face a high degree of  Type I uncertainty 
for reasons other than competition ; in particular , uncertainty 
with respect to inputs can play more or less the same rol e .  For 
example , some petroleum companies are in a much poorer position 
than others with respect to oil reserves , and for this reason are 
more dynamic than the other petroleum companies . Or , to take a 
more extreme example , because of input uncertainty Japanese steel 
firms have a far greater incentive to engage in dynamic behavior 
than do American s teel firms . 
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1-lhile Type I uncertainty provides firms with challenges , 
Type II uncertainty provides opportunities . To clarify this 
concept of uncertainty it will be useful to distinguish between 
three states of the world . The first is a completely predictable 
world in which chance plays a zero role . For example , in general 
equilibrium economics the entrepreneur is assumed to know the 
final equilibrium price before any trading takes place . In such 
a completely deterministic world entrepreneurs have no opportunity 
whatsoever to be lucky . Secondly , we can consider a world in 
which entrepreneurs can make predictions of each other ' s  actions 
in probabalistic terms . However , while chance can play a role 
in this world , it is a completely prescribed role , because it 
does not acknowledge the probability of  events not included in an 
initial subj ective probability distribution . Finally , we can 
consider a world of strong uncertainties -- a world in which the 
uncertainties cannot be measured in terms of probability distri­
butions , because quite unexpected events do occur -- this is a 
world in which the stronger the uncertainties , the greater the 
roles likely to be played by both good and bad luck . 
Such uncertainty is measured in terms of the variance 
of out comes of research and development proj ects . A high variance 
outcome indicates that entrepreneurs recognize the possibility of  
opportunities . A low variance imp lies that entrepreneurs have 
stopped asking sharp questions . For example , in the discussion 
of  aircraft operating costs we saw that during the period of
rapid progress the difference between the lowest and highest cost 
alternative averaged about 50  percent . Such outcomes imp ly a 
high degree of Type II uncertainty . On the other hand , a 10 
percent difference would imply a low degree of uncerta inty . 
As is implied by the previous discussion, the relation-
ship between Type I uncertainty and Type II uncertainty is simply 
this : when Type I uncertainty increases we can expect to observe 
that at some point an industry will respond to the increase in 
feedback by (1)  creating more favorable internal incentives for 
risk-taking ; and by (2)  acquiring a greater degree of openness 
(as measured by the randomness of the internal and external 
communications) . The consequence of bringing the internal 
organization into a greater degree of harmony with its external 
environment will be to speed up the rate of progress .  In 
particular , if the rate of progress is measured in terms of  cost 
reductions we can expect to observe a more rapid rate of progress .  
On the other hand , when Type I uncertainty declines j ust the 
oppos ite occurs with entrepreneurs tending to pose less searching 
questions , with luck playing a less important role in R&D 
outcomes , and , therefore , with a lower rate of progress .  In 
other words , we can expect to observe an S-shaped curve with a 
period of rapid progress in moving alternatives away from the 
center of a distribution (fast history) followed by a period of  
slower progress (slow his tory) . However ,  as will be brought out 
in the next section , the predicted responses to an increase in 
the degree of Type I uncertainty are of a very different 
character from the predicted responses of a decline , as different 
as waking up is from going to sleep . 
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Let us suppose that we are dealing with the second kind 
of situation -- a decline in Type I uncertainty . When fast 
history turns into slow history how can we be sure what is cause 
and what is effect? Are firms merely responding to a decline in 
their opportunities or are the opportunities declining because 
the degree of  openness is becoming smaller and smaller? There 
are two fundamental reasons for assuming that the basic explanation 
is to be found in a declining degree of openness brought about 
by the failure of new firms to enter the indus try . The first is 
an empirical reason . Assume that the industry in question is 
experiencing slow history -- that it is on the relatively flat 
portion of an S-shaped curve -- and a discovery comes along to 
provide an acceleration in the rate of  progress . Now, if the 
rate of progress were limited by opportunities we would expect 
that maj or firms in the industry would account for their share 
of revitalizing discoveries . But they do not . Of 50 such cases 
about which I managed to find evidence all the revitalizing 
discoveries came either from a new firm in the industry (e . g . , the 
Polaroid camera) , a firm from another industry (e . g . , diesel 
locomotive s ,  synthetic fibers) , or from a university laboratory 
(e . g . , computerized machine tools) . 1 1  
The second and more basic reason a dec line in opportunities 
is not a fundamental cause of  slowdowns is that the phenomenon of 
diminishing returns is no t applicable where ideas are concerned . To 
be sure , if a technology is defined narrowly enough , for example , 
if railroad transportation is defined to include only the 
possibility of st eam engines , it can be predicted that sooner or 
4 7  
later the rate of  progress will diminish . However , i f  the definit ion 
of a technology is more or less cont inuously broadened there need 
be no decline in the rate o f  progress .  Or , to put the same 
point another way , assume that the conditional probab ility of 
one or another firm being lucky in a present time period ( say , 
a period of three years) depends on the degree of luck realized 
during previous t ime periods . In other words , assume that a 
good idea can help pave the way for more good ideas . Now it is 
true , of  cours e ,  that in the present time period no firm may be 
lucky . But as long as it is as sumed that the probability of  luck 
in a given period is not independent of the degree of luck 
realized in previous periods , the slope of the curve relating 
the rate of progress to time will remain the same : that is , under 
this assumption opportunities would never vanish and the rate of  
progress in an industry would never slow down ! But typically , 
the rate of progress does slow down -- and what reason can be 
given for the slowdown other than a decline in challenges? 
To be sure , insiders will not necessarily agree with 
this point of view. On the contrary , they can be counted upon to 
insist that progress is slower because bringing about impressive 
advances had become enormously more difficult ; and in one sense 
they are absolutely right . A more constrained environment will 
make bringing about such advances more difficult . 
RESPONSES TO INCREASES AND DECLINES IN THE DEGREE OF TYPE I UNCERTAINTY : 
Let us assume that firms have become accustomed to dealing 
with either a low or high degree of Type I uncertainty , as the case 
may be . Further , let us assume tha t th e dif ference in feedback is 
reflected in the internal character is tics of firms : that is , 
those accustomed to dealing with a high degree of feedback will 
feature more favorabl e  incentives for individual risk-taking and 
more diverse internal and external interactions . To be sure , 
some firms may be unwilling or unab le to bring their internal 
characteristics into tune with the signals from their external 
environments . However , if a serious discrepancy occurs for many 
years it is quite unlikely such firms will survive . 
The first part of this section will deal with responses 
to increases in the degree of  feedback . In dynamic economics 
response is measured in terms of outputs rather than inputs . 
At the one extreme there is the response that is so rapid and so 
ef fective that the firm or firms in question experience no 
serious decline in market share . Conversely , there is the 
response that is so delayed and so weak a decade must pass before 
the decline is somewhat arres ted . However ,  it  can be assumed 
that response is non-linear because the more entrenched the 
internal technostructure , the more cohesive the internal alliances , 
the greater amount of feedback that will be required to ellicit 
any respons e .  
S tatistically speaking , however , there i s  good reason 
to assume that the speed and effectivenes s  of a firm ' s  response 
will be highly correlated : inasmuch as both are dependent upon 
its internal characteristics . 
Much empirical work remains to be done before economists 
can develop reliable dynamic reaction functions . However ,  on the 
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Figure Jl 
Dynamic  R esponse to Add ition a l  Feed b a c k  
Computer f irms 
ATB T 
Cotton texti l e  f irms 
Automobi le f irms 
? - Steel  f i rms 
Degree of Feed back 
s o  
basis of  fragmentary information , I have made some rough guesses 
of  the likely differences between dynamic response curves for
f irms from several industries ; these are shown in Figure V .  
The reader may be surprised by the fact that AT&T appears on the 
diagram . Most people think of AT&T as a monopoly ,  and of  Bell 
Telephone Laboratories as an organization which for many years 
has remained highly dynamic without the need of a hidden foot . 
In short , it seems that in this case we have found an almost 
perfect example of  Schumpeter ' s  dream of the day when progress 
would become quite automatic . 
This quite commonly held belief about AT&T is wrong . 12 
In the firs t place , informed people are in agreement that Bell 
Telephone Laboratories was not nearly as dynamic an organization 
in the period before World War II as it was after . In the second 
place , it is not difficult to explain the rise in its dynamic 
behavior .  In addition t o  the minor challenges with which AT&T 
dealt before World War I I ,  after World War II it encountered three 
maj or one s .  , During the late 1940s several firms became interested 
in using microwave systems as a relatively inexpensive method of 
long-range communications . These included both television companies 
and large corporations that wanted to establish their own 
communication networks . The technical response to these threats 
was development of the TD-2 microwave system. The nontechnical 
response consisted of arguments before the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) that common carrier capacity was large enough 
for all needs . The FCC ruled in favor o f  AT&T with respect to 
television signals , but ruled against it with respect to private 
users of microwave sys tems . Second , in the early 1960s the 
Hughes Corporation was able to persuade Congress that its 
communications satellite system was a better bet than the Early 
Bird satellite developed by AT&T . Moreover , when the Hughes ' 
system turned out to provide a less expensive alternative than 
transatlantic cables for international telephone calls , AT&T 
suddenly found itself faced with a greater threat . However , it 
was able to persuade the FCC that a mixed sys tem of satellites 
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and cables was best . As it has shown in several decisions , the 
FCC is willing to permit outsiders to compete with AT&T for new 
services . But for a regulatory agency to allow a new alternative 
to result in the creative destruction of a somewhat older one is 
almost unthinkable . Finally , in the 1960s a new series of  
threats arose when Microwave Communications , Incorporated (MCI) 
proposed to act as a common carrier for private owners of 
communications systems . In 1969 , six years after MCI ' s  application 
was submitted , the FCC approved . Shortly afterward the FCC was 
flooded with thirty applications by firms that wanted to es tablish 
themselves as one or another kind of common carrier . AT&T ' s  
response was t o  offer t o  private users a competitive system (Data 
Under Voice) that was more reliable and could provide a s ignificant 
cost savings . 
In shor t ,  there can be no doubt whatsoever that the 
hidden foot -- often in the form of attacks by relatively new 
firms -- played a maj or role in explaining why Bell Telephone 
Laboratories became a more dynamic organization after World War II . 
One principal difference between AT&T and General Motors is that 
having a relatively unstructured organization in the form of Bell 
Laboratories as well as a more structured organi zation in the form 
of Western Electric , AT&T has a substantial advantage in its 
ability to deliver a quick technological response to additional 
feedback. On the other hand , by being regulated by the FCC 
it also has an advantage in getting the rules of  the game 
modified when its technological prowess does not suffice . For 
both of these reasons , competitive inroads into AT&T ' s  markets 
have been held to something like 5 percent of her business , 
while during the period 1955 to 1975 the share of the automobile 
market accounted for by foreign cars rose from about 5 to well 
over 20 percent . 
If AT&T made its decisions in terms of the longer-run 
interests of its stockholders , it would not try to protect Bell 
Telephone Laboratories and Western Electric from outside 
competition . It would welcome such competition with open arms ! 
Figure V shows cotton textile firms having a greater 
dynamic response capability than automobile firms . The reason is , 
based on fragmentary data , it appears that in response to the 
threat from synthetic fibers cotton textile firms moved forward 
faster and more effectively than did the automob ile industry in 
dealing with its foreign competition . As for American steel 
firms , while they are certainly less dynamic than automobile 
firms , how much less dynamic is an open question . No one knows 
the amount of additional negative feedback that would be required 
to wake up the steel indus try . 
When firms respond to a sharp and persistent increase 
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in the degree of negative feedback very of ten the ideas needed to 
respond are not lacking ; that is , they are ideas that entrepreneurs 
far down in the organization hierarchy have b een trying to sell to 
the vice-president s .  On the other hand , when ideas are lacking , 
the entrepreneurs will typically begin to search outside the 
organization while the vice-presidents are still busily engaged 
in convincing each other that the decline in market share is only 
temporary . However , sooner or later one of the more adventurous 
vice-presidents will begin communicating with the entrepreneurs ;  
and after an organizational struggle new coalitions will be 
forme d .  I n  short , when the internal p ower structure is not so  
completely cemented together that it is quite insensitive to  
feedback , the predicted organizational response is  a greater 
diversity of internal and external interactions . Moreove r ,  while 
internal incentives may or may not be changed , it can be assumed 
that those who are successful in taking risks will be rewarded . 
Next , let us turn to the case of a persis tent decline 
in Type I uncertainty . Such a decline might occur because an 
industry was able to gradually reduce uncertainty with respect 
to its inputs . But , let us suppose that the cause of the decline 
in question is a reduction in feedback brought about by the fact 
that new firms are not entering the industry at the rate they 
once were . In order to better describe the proces s ,  a concept 
will now be introduced that plays a central role in dynamic 
economics :  the distinction between micro- and macrostability . 
An industry with a high degree of microstability is a highly 
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predictable industry : market shares remain approximately cons tant , 
there is a relatively small degree of variance in the outcomes of  
research and development proj ects , and the pattern of  communi­
cations within the associated firms is highly predictable . Good 
examples are provided by the Swiss chocolate and the Sco ttish 
textile industries . Conversely , inasmuch as it is concerned with 
the ability of an industry as a whole to make smooth adj ustments 
to new circumstances ,  macrostability is a dynamic concept of  
stab ility. The degree of  macrostability is measured by the rate 
the performance of a technology improves ,  whether measured in 
terms o f  reductions in costs or improvements in quality . 
A good example of an industry possessing a high degree 
of macrostability is the U .  S .  semiconductor industry . Assume 
that we can devise a satisfactory measure of the rate of  
technological progress . Then , up until about 1970 the pic ture 
was that of a rapidly rising portion of an S-shaped curve , as 
shown in Figure VI . The vertical lines on the curve repres ent 
maj or discoveries such as the silicon j unction transistor , the 
tunnel diode , the Planar transistor , the integrated circui t ,  and 
so forth . Viewed as isolated events these discoveries were quite 
unpredictable . That the entire process was both rapid and smooth 
indicates an industry in which there was a good deal of feedback . 
However , as a technology matures scale economies and 
vertical integration become more important . For example , the 
difference between Texas Instruments today and Texas Instruments 
in , say , 1955 is more or less the difference between General 
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Motors in 1908 and General Motors in 1920 . As a consequence , if 
a new firm wishes to enter the industry on the same basis as a 
well-established firm , it is likely to find that the cost of 
entry has increased by an order of  magnitude . This is not to 
say , of course ,  that even with higher entry costs new firms can-
not enter . But it is to say that the potential entrepreneurs 
mus t be very clever not only in generating new ideas , but in 
persuading somebody to provide the risk-capital . Consequently , 
as a technology matures the probability of new firms entering an 
industry is likely to decline very substantially -- and as entry 
declines so will the degree of macrostability . 
When entry into an industry slackens the degree of macro-
stability as measured by the rate of progress as shown in Figure 
VI will decline . As long as new firms enter an industry we can 
assume that from a micro point of view outcomes will be highly 
unpredictable , whether measured in terms of the outcomes of  
research and development proj ects or changes in market share . 
On the other hand , we can also be fairly certain that as long as 
this situation exists the continuation of rapid progress will be 
highly predictable . Let u1 be the uncertainty with respect to
the continuation of  the steeply ascending portion of  the curve 
shown in Figure VI ; and let u2 be the degree of uncertainty with
respect to micro outcomes ( i . e . , Types I and II uncertainties) . 
Then , as is shown in Figure VII , a low degree of uncertainty with 
respect to the continuance of the fast history trend implies a 
high degree o f  uncertainty with respect to micro outcomes (A) . 
However , as more and more certainty is introduced into micro 
u, 
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outcomes (due to the failure of new firms to enter the industry) , 
continuance o f  the previous rate of progress becomes more and 
more uncertain (as we go from A to B and from B to C) , which is to 
say , we can predict that sooner or later the rate of progress will 
decline . 
The two mos t  important differences between increases 
and declines in Type I uncertainty are the following : Firs t ,  
whereas the former involve highly discontinuous responses , the 
latter do not . As entrepreneurs are phased out of the operation 
managers acquire an ever more important role . Second , when Type 
I uncertainty declines , changes in incentives and organizational 
characteristics are much easier to measure.  Indeed ,  even without 
any measurement ,  it is not necessary to be a social anthropolo-
gist to discern what is happening . 
Finally , let us assume that no new firms enter the 
industry in question for , say , a period of 10 to 20 years . What 
kind of equilibrium will be ultimately reached , and what is the 
nature of the process when a dynamic equilibrium co llapses into 
a static equilibrium? To answer these questions requires 
consideration of the following topics : 
1 .  Movements toward the center of a distribution that result 
in trivial differences in products .  
2 .  The reasons the final equilibrium is likely to be stable . 
3 .  Why , when a dynamic equilibrium collapses , the path is 
likely to be highly predictable . 
Suppose that the t ime is 1965 , when the demand for 
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gasoline was relatively inelastic with respect to small changes 
in price . And also assume that initially two gasoline stations 
are located on a line in a manner that would minimize transpor-
tation costs for the buyers , that is : 
A B 
I I I ------, 
However , while this is a quite satisfactory situation 
from the standpoint of the consumer , it is not from that of the 
gasoline stations ' owners . To be sure , the customers to the West 
of A and to the East of  B represent a captive audience , so to 
speak .  However ,  inasmuch a s  A can increase the s i z e  of  his 
captive audience by moving closer to the center , the possibility 
of  higher profits will pull him in that direction . However ,  when 
this happens B receives negative feedback . And to reestablish 
his market position he must move toward the center . A partial 
equilibrium is reached when the gasoline stations are on adj acent 
corners . To be sure , if the cost and services were indistin-
guishable , one s tation could cut prices in order to draw customers 
away from the other ' s  territory . But , let us assume that to 
minimize the probability o f  such behavior each gasoline station 
o ffered a slightly different product ,  and that the gasoline
station attendants learned to recognize the idiocyncracies of their 
various customers . When this happens markets will be shared , and 
we will be in a static equilibrium in respect to both geographical 
and product space . Moreover , the same forces will draw other 
business firms to the center of the line . Consequently the final 
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equilibrium position i s  one in which there i s  a clustering of  
business firms with feedback no longer playing a significant 
role . 
What if demand were elastic with respect to the cost of  
transportation? Under this assumption firms located in the center 
would lose business of customers located on the extremities of 
the distribution . Moreover , as people move into the outlying 
areas the losses would become greater and greater . When this 
occurred new clusterings would appear in the more and more out-
lying areas . 
In order to observe the same tendencies at work with 
respect to national markets , we obviously must define product 
space in a somewhat different manner . For example , consider the 
automobile industry during the 1950s when foreign competition 
provided a negligible amount of feedback . At that time competition 
took place mainly in terms of  style . And , while it is an open 
quest ion to what extent automobile markers created a taste for 
style or merely responded to such tastes , the fact of  the matter 
is that firms that failed to recognize a change in style , and ,  
hence , a new movement toward the center were seriously penalized . 
For example , Chrysler , which was very slow to adapt to long tail-
fins , found that from 1952  to 1954 its sales had declined from 
20 percent to 12 percent of the market .  In other words , i t  paid 
more or less the same price for ignoring Hotelling ' s  law as did 
Senator Goldwater . 
Another dimension of commodity space is conspicuous 
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consumption or Veblen space . For example,  for many years one 
could buy a nearly identical Ford or Chevrolet intermediate car , 
with more or less the same options , depending on his preferences . 
But depending on his preference for conspicuous consumption , he 
could buy essentially the same automobile with the same options 
in the form of a Mercury or a Buick . 
It must be emphasized again that movements toward the 
center of a distribution assume an industry in which there is a 
negligible amount o f  feedback . Consequently , after some 
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minimum threshold in rivalry has been reached , Hotelling ' s  law 
will cease to make good predictions , which is to say , alternatives 
will be driven away from the center of a distribution . For 
example , as a consequence of  being quicker to borrow ideas formerly 
found in foreign cars , the 1979 General Motors intermediate cars 
are significantly different automobiles from the corresponding 
Ford and Chrysler cars . However,  inasmuch as the share of the 
automobile market accounted for by foreign firms rose from less 
than 5 percent during the 1950s to over 25 percent during the 
1960s , we certainly can predict that at some point the industry 
will respond to more feedback ; and the response. will take the 
form of making the alternatives look less alike . Moreover,  we 
can also predict that for such a response to have occurred the 
inner pattern of alliances within General Motors must have 
changed . Without becoming a more interactive organization , it 
simply could not have responded to the additional feedback in 
the manner it did . 
To re turn to the discussion of the nature of a Hotelling 
equilibrium , it should be apparent that even in the case of a 
single product , differentiation can take many different forms , 
some very subtle . Moreover , we can assume that when feedback is 
lacking product differentiation will take on a variety of forms . 
When the name of the game is to minimize the probab ility that a 
rival will engage in price cutt ing , it pays to recognize both the 
idiosyncrasies of particular consumers and the differences between 
consumers . Therefore , whereas Hotelling ' s  model dealt with only 
one type of product variation (making cider more or less sweet) , 
it must be acknowledged that in the real world many distinctions 
between products will be made . To be sure , scale economies will 
limit the extent to which a product can be tailored for a 
particular consumer . But taking scale economies into account , 
firms try to go as far as possible in recognizing individual 
differences in tastes . For example , in an excellent article on 
the ready-to-eat breakfast food industry (an industry no new 
firm has entered for some years ) ,  Richard Schmalensee has in 
effect extended the Hotelling argument by taking up a case in 
which the variations include differences with respect to sweet­
ness , protein content , shape , grain base , and crunchiness . 1 3
According t o  his argument , firms i n  the industry went about as 
far as they could in recognizing these differences -- with the 
consequence that price cutting has rarely occurred . However , 
whereas the firms in the breakfas t  food industry were good at 
recognizing differences in taste s ,  they were apparently not 
nearly so expert in detecting changes in tastes . When natural 
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health foods became popular during the early 1970s , quite a 
number of new firms entered the market ;  only after that did the 
well-established firms respond to the change in demand conditions . 
In fact , even when demand conditions are fairly well-known , 
es tablished firms are o ften slow to recognize changes in tastes . 
Conside r ,  for example , the long time elapse before the hamburger 
chain restaurants began to provide more variety in their menus . 
Why , when reached , is a Hotelling equilibrium likely 
to be very s table? The essential reason has already been given ; 
namely , when firms no longer have to deal with feedback they lose 
their ability to engage in anything but routine tasks . To be 
sure , calcification does not occur immediately ; it o ften takes 5 
to 10 years . As it occurs the obvious response of firms is to 
protect themselves from feedback . Consequently , they engage in 
product differentiation and advertising . However , while product 
differentiation insures firms against small price cuts on the part 
of their rivals , it obviously does not against the possibility o f  
a large cut . Under what circumstances are large cuts likely t o  
occur? A firm might cut i t s  prices and profits t o  drive another 
out of business .  But price wars do not occur often .  On the o ther 
hand , a firm might be quite willing to reduce its prices if it 
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can bring about (or has brought about) a quite significant reduction 
in its costs . But calcified firms are no t likely to be able to 
reduce their costs significantly . Hence , a Hotelling equilibrium 
is very stable inasmuch as it minimizes the probability of either 
small or large price cuts . What makes it stable is that a firm 
is not likely to start a war it cannot finish . Hence , such an 
equilibrium can be described as a system o f  stable mutual 
deterrence . 14 
However , it is important to keep in mind that , while 
such an equilibrium is stable from the point of view of the 
Captains of Industry , it is not necessarily stable from the point 
of view of potential entrepreneurs in firms , who enj oy bringing 
about discontinuous advances . Moreover , from their point o f  
view (as distinct from the point of view of the top leadership) , 
when the Oldsmobile Division is able to reduce the Buick 
Division ' s  share of the market ,  that is something like winning in 
the Olympics . Henc e ,  to curb these troublemakers who would dis turb 
the peace , the main posts are given to trustworthy managers , 
incentives are developed to discourage risk-taking , and formidable 
rules and regulations are developed to make any and all change 
difficult . In brie f ,  while a Hotelling equilibrium is stable 
from the point of view of the top management , company regulations 
are required to maintain the peace . 
Finally , the path toward a Ho telling equilibrium is 
likely to be highly predictable , because it involves self-prophe-
sizing changes in expectations . Assume that an industry is in a 
dynamic equilibrium because of the entry of new firms . To be sure , 
the new entrants and the well established firms will not behave 
the same . But , assuming that every firm has adj usted its behavior 
to deal best as it can with this degree o f  feedback , from a 
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technical point o f  view that can be described as a Nash equilibrium: 
an equilibrium in which the strat,egies of firms are j ointly 
consistent . Howeve r ,  a Hotelling static equilibrium can also be 
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so described . The difference between the two equilibria is  that 
one generates a high degree of feedback while the other generates 
none . This , in turn , means that whereas in the first equilibrium 
alternatives will be veering away from the middle of  a distribution 
due to the generation of new ideological mutations , in the second , 
alternatives will be moving toward the center o f  a dis tribution , 
with mutations becoming less and less s ignificant . 
When entry of new firms stops , so does the principal 
means of bringing new ideas into the industry . Selection of top 
managements either from within the firm or within the industry 
insures that product differences will be minor . 
Another way of describing the collapse of a dynamic 
equilibrium is as a collapse of expectations . Whether an industry 
is in a dynamic or static equilibrium expectations will remain the 
same . But , in going from one equilibrium to the other expectations 
do not remain the same , because where in the firs t case they are 
premised on continuing surprises , in the second they are premised 
on remaining unsurprised . The change in expectations occurs , 
because when new firms discontinue entering an industry , es tablished 
firms will find that their expectations with respect to surprises 
have been underfulfilled , and as they continue to be less surprised , 
their expectations and b ehavior will change . Thus , not only is 
a Hotelling equilibrium very stable , but b ecause of its self­
prophesizing character the path from a dynamic to a s tatic equi­
librium is almost as predictable as death and taxes . 
Limitations o f  Dynamic Theory : Although it is my convic tion that 
only by taking feedback into account can economics become a pre­
dictive science , a few words are in order about the limitations 
of dynamic theory . 
Firs t ,  in making predictions we do not pretend that 
individual discoveries can be predicted . Dynamic economics is 
not concerned with making microscopic predictions . Rather , it is 
concerned with making macroscopic predictions -- predictions of the 
rate of progress as a function of the degree of Type I uncertainty . 
Second , it should be apparent that once the rate of  
progress in a particular industry has leveled off , it  is not easy 
to predict the dynamic response to increases in the degree of  
feedback . To b e  sure , empirical work relating increases in the 
degree o f  feedback to the dynamic response will enable us to make 
better predictions . However , inasmuch as a few key people can 
often make a s ignificant difference with respect to the timing of
the response ,  it might never be possible to make really good 
predictions . 
Third , dynamic theory does no t permit us to make com­
parisons across indus tries ; that is , we cannot infer that progress 
is higher in one industry than another because of  differences in 
the degree of  feedback . The reason is simply that in some 
industries it is easier to broaden the definition of the technology 
(e . g . , as j et engines broadened the definition of aircraft 
technology ; as Bessemer steel broadened the definition of steel 
technology ; as semiconductors broadened the definition of  computer 
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technology) . 
For example , in railroad technology the rate of advance 
in total factor productivity has been very respectable . As 
Figure VIII shows , in the railroad industry its average rate of  
increase was not as great as transportation as a whol e ;  but it  
was greater than for manufacturing in general . Moreover , it  
should be noted that although railroad technology is very old 
there is no evidence of  retardation in the rate o f  productivity 
increase .  
Nevertheless , it can also b e  said that were it not for 
regulation progress in reducing costs would have b een faster . In 
general , the effect of economic regulation is that by stabilizing 
market shares feedback is removed from industries and , therefore , 
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they have no incentive to b e  quick to adopt new ideas . Consequently, 
the rate of diffusion of new advances in the railroad industry has 
been very slow . According to estimates made by Edwin Mansfield , 
once one railroad adopted an invention it took a long time before 
the industry as a whole adopted it ; about fifteen years for the 
diesel locomotive , twenty-five years for the Mikado locomotive , 
twenty years for the four-wheel trail ing truck locomotive , 
twenty-five years for centralized traffic control , and thirty 
years for car retarders . 1
5 
Inasmuch as the adoption rate depends 
in part on the profitability of inventions and the size of the 
investment required , it is necessary to hold these factors 
constant when making comparisons with other industries . By making 
calculations on that basis , Mansfield found that the time between 
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10 and 90 percent adoption was about six years shorter in the 
steel industry , two years shorter in the coal industry , and 
fourteen years shorter in the brewing industry than in the 
railroad industry . To be sure , as Mansfield points out , the 
differences between the railroad and coal industries may not be 
statistically significant ; but these can hardly be regarded 
d . . d . 16 as ynamic in ustries . 
Yet , even the railroads seem to be moderately responsive 
to increases in the degree of feedback . From 1950 to 1960 , due 
mainly to competition from trucks , intercity freight traffic for 
railroads declined by about 25 percent . As a consequence , during 
the period 1960 to 1970 the average rate of increase of total 
factor productivity doubled that of  the previous decade (see 
Figure VIII) . About one-half of  the gain came from closing down 
less profitable line s ;  and half from speeding up the rate of  
diffusion . 
It can be seen , therefore , that , while we cannot make 
comparisons across industries , there are ways o f  detecting whether 
the industry in question is making good use of its potential . 
Moreover , when feedback within the industry in question begins to 
play a significantly more important role we can always be 
confident of  the result . 
III . UNDERSTANDING THE PRODUCTIVITY DECLINE 
A number of reasons can be given for the U . S .  decline in 
the rate of product ivity gain since the mid-19 60s , including the 
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impact of  safety and environmental regulations , the rising cost 
of  investment relative to depreciation allowances , and the
increasing degree of cons traint imposed on productivity gains by 
labor unions . Nevertheless , while these factors contributed t u
the severity of the decline , it is my conviction that it would 
have occurred anyway . To be sure , one can imagine an economy 
which perpetually maintains its dynamism by adding one new 
industry during each time period . However , technological 
revolutions do come in bunches , with advances in one field ( for 
example , semiconductors) paving the way for advances in another 
(for example , computers) .  And due to the order of  magnitude 
increase in the cost of entry as a technology matures , sooner or 
later the rate of  entry is bound to decline . 
Moreover,  this explana tion not only holds true for the 
current predicament of the U . S .  economy , but also for most of the 
long cycles (the so-called Kuznets cycles) in economic activity . 
Though the cycles begin with the generation of a wide diversity 
of ideas , during the prosperity period entry declines ; and , as a 
consequence of the decline in entry , sooner or later the economy 
decends to a Hotelling equilibrium . For example , during the first 
part of  this century the alternatives were certainly moving 
away from the center of a distribution in many industries . Yet , 
if we take Hotelling ' s  word for it , by the late 1920s there were 
trivial differences in a variety of industries between products 
as well as between political partie s .  
It should be borne in mind , however , that one factor 
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greatly contributed to the severity o f  the Great Depression that 
is not present today . The automobile boom resulted in an increase 
in output and investment not only in the automobile industry , but 
in a number of related industries increases that could not b e  
sustained . However , today only a drastic decline in petroleum 
imports could have a similar impact on the economy . 
Even longer economic cycles have been observed in other 
countries . Britain experienced a long cycle that began about 
1800 and ended about 1880 . As o f ,  say , 1850 rivalry was wide­
spread in British industry : witness the fact that prices o f  
practically all industrial commodities rapidly fell . But by 
1890,  British industry as a whole had become famous for its slow 
history . And as rivalry died out there was a profound change in 
the internal characteristics o f  British firms ; that is , whereas 
earlier British entrepreneurs came from a wide variety of back­
grounds , by the end o f  the century British Captains of Industry 
were almost entirely lawyers and accountants . Indeed , it is for 
this reason, no doubt , that the British economy never fully 
recovered from the Great Depression of the 1880s . Since 1900 
Britain has had the lowest productivity growth , a chronic 
balance of payments problem, and has experienced a very significant 
decline in living s tandards , as compared with other maj or 
industrial countries .  
Recovery from a long cycle is by no means automatic . 
Indeed , it can be predicted that as an economy acquires a larger 
and larger proportion of older indus tries , in which firms do their 
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best to isolate themselves from feedback (whether by product 
differentiation , advert is ing , or protec tive tariffs) , the 
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average degree of openness in the economy as a whole will decline 
and , when it does , recovery from the long cycles will become 
progressively more difficult . To be sure , in many ways wars can 
alter this result . Consider , for example , the remarkable recoveries 
of the Japanese and German economies after World War II . However , 
no one would seriously propose that wars be provoked to accomplish 
what politicians are unwilling to do . 
Long cycles in economic activities are dependent not 
only upon the entry of new firms . Large increases in the number 
of mergers are also indicators of an oncoming economic paralysis . 
For example , during the late nineteenth century there was an 
enormous increase in mergers in British industry . During the 1920s 
the United States experienced its second largest merger movement .  
And during the 1960s and 1970s a merger movement o f  similar pro­
portions occurred , with the new factor being the emergence o f  
international conglomerates . 
From the point of view of the firm , mergers are easy to 
explain . Obviously , growth by acquisition is easier to attain 
than growth by entrepreneurship and luck . Moreover ,  to the extent 
that mergers resul t in diversification , they provide a way to in­
sure firms against risks . However ,  what is good for an individual 
firm is not necessarily good for an entire economy . Almost 
inevitably mergers result in a decline in risk-taking , and , by so 
doin g ,  contribute to a poor showing in productivity gains . 
Vertical integration will almost inevitably result in 
a decline in risk-taking , because it leads to a decline in Types 
I and II uncertainties . Consider , for example , the British air­
craft industry during the period 1950 to 1960 . As of that time 
all aircraft companies except Rolls Royce were vertically inte­
grated firms that developed and produced both aircraft and air­
craft engines . Yet , the number of times a vertically integrated 
firm was able to mate one of its own engines to one of its own 
aircraft was less than the number that would be determined by 
chance .
1 7 The reason:  in something like three out o f  four 
cases the airplane ended up with a Rolls Royce engine . Rolls 
Royce had an advantage because it enjoyed a relatively high 
degree of Type I uncertainty ; that is , unless it developed 
superior engines it was in a relatively poor position to sell 
engines . So to deal with this uncertainty it had to put more 
emphasis on developing basic engine technology than did other 
companies . On the other hand , it enjoyed a greater degree of  
Type II uncertainty because , as far as the customers were 
concerned ,  it had more options . When one of its engines was 
successful , a vertically integrated aircraft company would 
rather switch to it than sell no airplanes . Consequently , with 
Rolls Royce in the picture they too had a greater incentive to 
take risks . A good example of  an automobile firm that had a 
s ignificant advantage , because it was less vertically integrated 
than its competitors , was Chrysler during the 1930s . According 
to William Abernathy , this provided the flexibility needed for 
Chrysler ' s  pioneering of high-compression engines , streamlined 
cars , disk brakes , and power steering. 18 
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Conversely , when all firms in an industry are vertically 
integrated , the degree of risk-taking will almost inevitably be 
smaller (because both buyers and sellers have to deal with a 
smaller degree of uncertainty) . Indeed , the main reason for 
vertical integration is not the much advertised reason -- that it 
will result in a gain in static efficiency . Rather , vertical 
integration is to be regarded as a protective mechanism that 
minimizes the probability of creative destruction of physical 
capital and a highly interrelated administrative structure . In 
short , vertical integration protects the lazy monopolist from 
unpredictability . 
Horizontal integration reduces risk-taking because it 
reduces Type I uncertainty . Consider a hypothetical example of  
a large electric sign company that purchases a highly successful 
small electric s ign company that is still owned and managed by 
its founder . By becoming part o f  a larger firm the smaller one 
is obviously better insured against uncertainty .  The former 
head of the small company may retire , or may develop a taste for 
fishing . But if he remains , his incentives will no t be the same . 
Moreover , in the name o f  sound management practices , the parent 
company will almost always impose a variety of controls on the 
acquired company : controls that will maximize short-term profits 
at the expense of longer-run profits . 
To be sure , mergers of smaller companies do not 
necessarily lead to this resul t .  A small company is likely to be 
more aware than a large one of the cost involved in imposing 
many onerous constraints upon entrepreneurship . 
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It is often argued that without mergers the incentive 
to establish a new business would not be as great as it is today . 
However , a larger firm acquiring a smaller firm is not the only 
way of selling a bus iness . Often a company is purchased by a 
group of individuals . To be sure , they may have difficulty in 
rais ing the capital ; but it can hardly be argued that imperfections 
in the capital markets is a valid reason for mergers . 
In brie f ,  the principal economic argument against mergers 
is not that they lead to a greater concentration of economic 
power ; but , rather , mergers have a negative incentive on risk­
taking . And because they seriously j eopardize the preservation 
of an economy with a high degree of dynamic stability , mergers 
between large firms should have been outlawed many years ago . 
Finally , there is another respect in which today ' s  
highly predictable new Victorian American state i s  like the older 
British Victorian state . Both Victorian periods reveal a marked 
decline in ability to successfully compete with other countries . 
As far as the United States is concerned , until about 1965 it 
traded with the rest of the world by exporting newly developed 
technologies and importing products made by technologies earlier 
developed here , as well as raw materials (the so-called Vernon 
trade cycle) . However ,  it must be emphasized that the U . S .  
comparative advantage in specif ic products did not long remain 
the same ; rather , it was a dynamic advantage . For example , during 
the 1880s , when rivalry was stil l  thriving in the steel industry , 
the United States exported steel to Britain and Scotland -- and , 
j ust as we are now accusing the Japanese of dumping , the Brit ish 
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were then accusing us . Late r  our comparativ� advantage shifted to 
automobiles and automob ile machinery ; and still later to commercial 
aircraft , synthetic fibers , comput ers , and semiconductors . As far 
8S the newer technologies are concerned , the U . S .  advantage resulted 
from the relative ease of starting new firms . On the other hand , 
the primary reason the United States had a disadvantage with 
respect to the export of older technologies is that , generally 
speaking , the foreign firms were newer and more energetic . 
However , as Figure IX shows , since the mid 1960s our 
ability to compete in foreign markets has steadily worsened 
Whereas we once enjoyed a virtual monopoly with respect to the 
export of the newer technologies , and imported only about one 
billion dollars annually , as of 1972 U . S .  imports were running 20 
billion dollars annually ; and the gap between the import and export 
of the older technologies has steadily widened . 
Although there can be no question that rivalry in the 
U . S .  economy has declined , unfortunately it is not possible to 
measure it . Only for a relatively few industries do we have 
data on changes in market shares . The Census Bureau does have 
the needed information . But , inasmuch as it cannot release 
information on individual establishments to the general public , 
the Census Bureau will have to be persuaded to make the required 
calculations ! Nevertheless , there is much indirect information 
available -- information on the internal characteristics o f  
firms - - suggesting that the degree o f  rivalry i s  n o t  what it 
was . For example , in <he 1979 Bat tel le Report , "ProbablE· Leve l s  
o f  R&D Expenditures in 1979 , "  among t h e  in ternal barriers t o
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innovation are listed the following : 
1 .  A growing insistence on certainty of profits in the 
short term. 
2 . The "not invented here" syndrome. 
3 .  Growth of a professional management class which has no 
entrepreneurial stake in the business . 
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4 .  Formalization of short-term executive tours of service 
e. g. , up, down, sideways, or out every three to five 
years -- discouraging longer-term ,  innovative proj ects . 
5 .  Use of executive incentives programs which emphasize 
accounting concepts of achievement. 
6 .  Failure to organize for innovation -- instead, business 
is increasingly organized for steady profitability and 
not for risk-taking. 
7 .  Tendency to try to buy corporate growth through 
acquisitions rather than through innovation and/or 
. 19 expansion. 
Finally, dynamic theory contributes not only to our 
understanding of the productivity slowdown, but also to the 
relationship between demand-pull (buyers) inflation and cost-push 
(sellers) inflation. Typically these are discussed as if they 
were entirely different subjects. For example, the proponents 
of demand-pull inflation argue that the large public deficits 
associated with the war in Vietnam was the basic cause of the 
beginning of inflation in the United States. On the other hand, 
the proponents of cost-push inflation point to the fact that 
inflation began in the steel industry, when in that industry wages 
started to go up more rapidly than productivity gains -- wage 
increases that were closely followed by price increases. However, 
these are intimately related factors in the sense that with less 
rivalry in an economy , the more prone it is likely to be to 
inflationary shocks . 
Rivalry actually performs two functions in an economy : 
(1) it acts as a stimulus to bringing about reductions in costs , 
and ,  hence , productivity gains ; and (2) it acts as a deterrent 
on wage and price increases . The reason rivalry performs the 
second function is that when labor unions push for rapid increases 
in wages in an industry possessing a significant degree of 
rivalry , they will find that they have caused unemployment in the 
less profitable firms . Generally speaking , in all industries 
there are wide variations in profit rates -- with the consequence 
that the labor unions cannot afford to ignore the impact of their 
actions on the less profitable firms . This is not to say , of 
course ,  that the constraint on wages provided by rivalry is 
necessarily the same in all industries . In some industries labor 
union leaders do not seem to care about the impact of their 
actions on unemployment . Consider , for example , the musicians 
union . On the other hand , in many other industries labor union 
leaders seem to be quite sensitive with respect to the impact 
of their actions on unemployment . Therefore it seems reasonable 
to assume that the truth lies somewhere between these extremes . 
On the other hand , in industries with little rivalry we 
can expect a relatively small degree of constraint on wage 
increases . For example , it is no accident that in the railroads 
it was the unions who benefited most from a system of economic 
regulation that had the effect of minimi zing feedback in that 
industry . Nor is it an accident that prior to deregulation of 
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the airlines , when there was little rivalry in that industry , the 
really gigantic gains in productivity were not reflected in lower 
rates .  Thus , whereas during the period 1955-1965 total factor 
productivity increased by about 80 percent , average passenger 
rates did not decline -- they increased . Thus , it was not the 
consumer who benefited from productivity increases , it was the 
labor unions -- during the period in question there was no 
significant increase in airlines ' profits . 20 Consequently , it 
can be said that this was an industry that featured cost-push 
inflation, even when there was relatively little inflation in the 
economy as a whole . 
The relationship between demand-pull and cost-push 
inflation is simply this : even when there is a minimum degree of 
excess demand in the economy as a whole , we can expect some degree 
of cost-push inflation in those industries with the smallest 
degree of rivalry -- but with inflationary shocks highly 
localized . However ,  when the degree of excess demand increases , 
we can expect that those industries with the least amount of 
rivalry will be the first to take advantage of the situation by 
charging what the market will bear . However ,  when industries , 
such as the steel industry , act in this manner , the shocks from 
excess demand will become more general . In short , if my 
hypothesis is correct , in response to excess demand , inflation 
will gain momentum most rapidly in those industries with the 
least amount of rivalry, and cost-push inflation will be absent 
longest in those industries with the most rivalry . 
As was indicated above , we do not have measures of 
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rivalry for a wide number of industries , and , because we do 
not ,  there is no direct way to test this hypothesis . However , I 
do have unpublished Bureau of Labor S tatistics data on productivity (P) , 
wage changes (W) and price changes ($)  for some 500 industries . It 
would have been preferable to have information on total factor 
productivity rather than labor productivity ; but , for the purpose 
of testing a rivalry hypothesis the avoidable estimates on total 
factor productivity are far too aggregated . 
To provide a rough test o f  the hypothesis , it will be 
assumed that a fair degree of  correspondence exists between the 
rate of productivity increase in various industries and their 
degree of rivalry . Another reason this is a rough tes t is that 
the calculations ignore the fact that after the beginning o f  
inflation in the 1960s the influence o f  rising input costs 
differed from industry to industry . 
If my hypothesis is a reasonable one , we can expect to 
observe two relationships . First ,  there should be a negative 
correlation between the rate of productivity advance and the 
rate of price increase .  As we already have seen , there is no 
automatic mechanism for distributing productivity gains in the 
form of lower prices . Therefore , if rivalry is generating 
relatively large productivity increases , it should also generate 
relatively small price increases . Second , in the high productivity 
industries the relationship between wage increases and productivity 
advances should be more constrained than in the low productivity 
industries . If rivalry is doing a good j ob in generating 
productivity advances , then it should be doing so in constraining 
wage increases . 
The computations contained in Figures X ,  XI and XII 
were made by dividing the 500 indus tries into three groups 
ranked in terms of productivity performance : low , medium and 
high . As the chart indicates , during the period 1965 to 1972  
there was a strong negat ive correlation between productivity and 
price changes ; and relative to the difference in the average 
annual rate of productivity gains , wages in the high productivity 
industries increased only about one-half as much as those in the 
low productivity industries . Thus , while expectations play an 
important role ·in wage changes , they are not based on the consumer 
price index but , rather,  on the previous degree of rivalry in the 
industry concerned . In o ther words , a low degree of rivalry and 
a high degree o f  unstatesmanlike behavior on the part o f  labor 
union leaders go hand in hand . 
As might be expected , there is a good deal of scatter 
around the average relationships j ust discussed . However , as 
Figures XIII and XIV indicate , the relationships are nonetheless 
quite impressive . The most important industries in each group 
and their performance are shown in the Appendix Tables . Among 
the poorest performers measured in price terms were various 
machine and machine tool indus tries , blast furnases and steel 
mills , printing and publishing , and newspapers . 
On the o ther hand , it is also apparent that in the 
period 19 72-1976 the differences in price and wage behavior 
between the three groups became insignificant , and , with wages 
and prices in all of them increasing at exponential rates . When 
82 
R 
E 
L 
A 
T 
I 
v 
E 
v 
A 
L 
u 
E 
s 
N P N P =  
2 . 0 0 0 E  0 2  
l . 7 0 0 E  0 2  
l . 4 0 0 E  0 2  
l . l O O E  0 2  
S . O O O E  0 1  
5 . 0 0 0 E  0 1  
FIGURE X 
INDUSTRY AVERAGE FOR LOW D /DT PRODUCTIVITY 
WW 
w 
w 
w 
WW 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
WW 
WW $ $ $  
WW $$ 
WW+ $$ 
w $ 
WW $ 
WW $ 
w $ 
WW $ 
w $ 
L'W $ 
WWW $ 
WW $ 
WWW P P P P P $ P P P P P P  P P  
WWW P P P P  $ P P P P P P P  
WWWW P P P  $ $ $  
P P P P P P WWWPP P P P P P P P P P  P P P  $ $ $ $  
P P P P P P P  WWWW P P P P P P  $ $ $ $  
P P P P P P P  W W  S $ $ $ $  
P P P P P P P P  WWWWW $ $ $ $  
P P P P P P P  WWWWWW $ $ $  
- P P P P P P P P P P P P P  WWWWWWW $ $ $ $  
P P  WWWWWW $ $ $ $  
WWWWWW+ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $  
wwwwwwww $ $ $ $ $ $ $  
-wwwuww $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $  
w $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $  
$ $ $  
AVERAGE CHANGE PER YEAR LOW ti PRODUCTIVITY 
Years liP/Yr . /ill/Yr . li$/Yr . 
58-72 1 . 89 5 . 1 2  2 . 34 
72-76 0 . 00 1 2 .  7 1 2 . 0  
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
l .  9 5 S E  0 3  l .  9 6 2 E  0 3  
Y E A R  
l .  9 6 5 E  0 3  l . 9 6 9 E  0 3  l .  9 7 2 E  0 3  l . 9 7 6 E  0 3  
W = COMP E N S A T I O N / H O U R  P = O U T P UT/MAN -H O U R  $ = P R I C E
Source : Bureau of  Labor Statistics . 
83 
FIGURE XI 
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FIGURE XIII 
7 . S O O E  0 0  PRICE CHANGES VERSUS PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES , 1958-1972 
T 
R 
E 5 . 7 0 0 E  0 0  
N 
D 
A 
v 
E 
R 
A 
G 
E 3 . 9 0 0 E  0 0  
D 
/ 
D 
T 
p 
R 
* 
- * *
* 
** 
* 
* 
* *  
* * *  ** 
* * * *  
* *  * * 
* 
lE 
* *  
* * * 
* * *  
* *  * *  * "'  * 
* * *  * *  * 
- lE * * * * * * * *  * * *  
* *  * 
* I 
c 
E 
s 
2 . l O O E  0 0  - * * * * * * * * * * +  * * * *  lE * 
3 . 0 0 0 E- O l  
- * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  * * *  
-lE * *  * *  * * * *  * * * * * * * *  * * * *  
- lE ** * * * * * * *  * * *  * * * * * ** 
* ** * * * * * * * * * *  ** * * * * *  
* * * * * * *  * *  * * * * * * * * * *  
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
* *  
* *  * *  
* * *  * 
* *  
* * *  * *  
* * * * * * *  * * *  * * * *  
* 
* * * *  * * * *  * * * * *  * * * 
* * 
* * 
* * 
* * * * * * * * * *  ** * * * * 
* * * ** ** ** * 
* * * * * ** 
* * 
* 
* * 
* * 
* *  * *  
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * *  
* *  
* 
* 
* * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
* * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
* * 
- 1 . S O O E  0 0  I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ! I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I  
N P N P =  2 1  0 .  0 2 . 0 0 0 E  0 0  4 . 0 0 0 E  0 0  6 . 0 0 0 E  0 0  8 . 0 0 0 E  0 0  l . O O O E  0 1  
T R E N D  A V ERAGE D/DT P R O D U C T I V I TY 
Source : Bureau of Labor Statistics . 
86 
N
 
..
... 
°'
 
.-I
 
"'
 
I 
co
 
V)
 
°'
 
.-I
 
Cf)
 
t"!l � u >' 
:>
 
E-<
 
H
 
H
 
:>
 
•
 
�
 
H
 
�
 
E-<
 
g; 
u
 
p
 
C!>
 
Q
 
H
 
� 
"'"'
 
11<
 
Cf)
 
p
 
Cf)
 
P'.
 
�
 
:>
 
Cf)
 
�
 
C!>
 
� u � C!> �
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0
 
0
 
UJ
 
UJ
 
UJ
 
0
 
0
 
00
 
"
'
 
"'
 
..
... 
"
'
 
t-
O!
l.U
Z
O
 
<t;
�
W
�
..
.-:((!)
W
 
o
,
o
t-
I 
:+:
 
"'
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
"'
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
"'
 
:+:
 
"'
 
"'
 
:+:
 
"'
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
"'
 
"'
 
"'
 
"'
 
,.
 
:+:
 
"'
 
"'
 
:+:
 
"'
 
:+:
 
"'
"'
"'
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
"'
 
:+:
 
"'
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
"'
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
*
 
::t:
 *
 
:+:
 
;+:: 
!t:: 
*
 
:«
 
;+:
: ;K 
*
 
�
 
*
 
*
 
*
*
*
*
:.K
*
*
:+:.
;+:
: 
;+:
: 
:«
:K
:K 
*
*
:+:.
 
*
 
*
 *
 
!K 
*
 
*
 
*
 *
 *
 ;+: *
 
:+:.
 
:t:
: 
!K *
 :.K
 
*
 
*
 
*
 *
 *
 :+:
 ::t:
 
*
 
;r.:
:.K
�K 
�
 
:«
 
;+:: 
:«
:+:.
;K
:«
;+:
: 
*
*
*
 
*
 
:«
;+:
::.K
:«
:t:
Z
:+:.
:t:
: 
*
 
!k 
*
 :K ;+:
: 
:+:.
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
:+:
:+:
:<
:+:
:+:
:+:
:+: 
:+: 
"'
"' 
*
*
*
;:t:
:;+::;K
;l(
;K
;te
;+:
:tc
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
"'
"'
"'
"'
"'
"' 
"'
"'
"'
*
 
:«
::t:
;t:.
;f(
;«
A(
;t:
: 
:«
 
*
 
!K
*
:.K
:K
*
:k
*
;+:
: 
:+: 
:+: 
"'
 
:+: 
:+:
:+:
:+:
:!:
:+:
:+:
:+: 
*
 
*
*
*
*
:.ti:
*
 
;+:::.1<
:r.: 
:+:.
:«
:t(
;.K
!K
:te
:t:: 
:+:.
:«
:«
::t:
: 
*
 
*
*
:«
;«:
;« 
*
*
*
*
 
*
*
�
*
*
*
 
*
*
*
*
:..K
*
*
*
;+:
:«: 
*
*
*
*
;I(
*
 
*
 
*
*
*
 
:.
.::*
 
*
*
*
*
*
;.!(
*
*
*
 
*
 
*
 *
 
;t(
 :.K
 :t:'
 
*
 
*
 
:«
;K
:te
;+:
::« 
*
 
*
*
*
*
*
*
:+:
 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
UJ
 
0
 
..
. 
"'
 
*
*
 
*
 
*
 
*
 
*
*
*
 
�k
*
 
*
*
;tr::*
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
*
*
*
*
 
*
*
 
*
*
:+:
 :+:
 
:+:
 
"'
 
I 
I 
I 
I 
*
 
*
 
*
 
:+:
 
:+:
 
:+:
 :+:
:+:
:+: 
:«
 :K 
:+:
:+:
 :+:
 :+:
 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0
 
0
 
UJ
 
0
 
N
 
..
. 
:+: I 
3
-c(
C>
W
Ul
 
"'
 
:+:
 
:+:
 :+:
 
"'
 
:+:
 
..
... 
..
... 
0
 
..
... 
..
... 
UJ
 
..
... 
..
... 
..
... 
..
... 
..
... 
..
... 
..
... 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
O
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
UJ
 
H
 
o
 
H
 
O
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
00
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
..
... 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
..
... 
H
 
H
 
H
 
..
... 
H
 
UJ
 
H
 
..
... 
0
 
H
 
0
 
H
 
H
 
-0
 
..
... 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
:t:
H..
... 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
..
... 
:l:
HH
 
:+:
HH
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
..
... 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
"'
 
H
 
0
 
0
 
UJ
 
UJ
 
:+:
:+:
H
:+:
 
:+:
 :+:
 
I 
I 
H
 
:+:
 
H
 
H
 
,.
 
..
... 
H
 
..
... 
H
 
..
... 
H
 
H
 
:+:
HH
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
H
 
I H
 
0
 
0
 
UJ
 
0
 
0
 
"
'
 
0
 
0
 
N
 
0
 
00
 
..
... 
II CL. 
:z:
 
CL.
 
:z:
 
>-..
. 
..
... 
>
 
H
 
..
. 
u
 
::
:> 
Cl
 
0
 
�
 
CL.
 
..
. 
Cl
 
'
 
Cl
 
UJ
 
"
'
 
<(
 
(/J
 
�
 
UJ
 
()
 
>
 
•.-!
 
<(
 
,_,
 
(/J
 
0
 
•.-!
 
:z:
 
,_,
 
UJ
 
<1J
 
�
 
,_,
 
..
. 
Cf)
 
H
 
0
 
.0
 
<1J
 
�
 
..
... 
0
 
::I
 
<1J
 
Q)
 
H
 
::I
 
P'l
 
Q)
 
()
 
H
 
::I
 
0
 
Cf)
 
2 . 0 0 0 E  0 2  
FIGURE XV 
RADIO AND TV RECEIVING SETS 
June 20 , 1978 
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FIGURE XVI 
PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS 
June 20 , 1978 
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FIGURE XVII 
SEMICONDUCTORS AND ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS 
June 20 , 1978 
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FIGURE XVIII 
KNITTING MILLS 
June 20 , 1978 
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it comes to overcoming the inhib itions of business and labor 
union leaders to engage in anticompetitive behavior , there 
apparently is nothing like inflation . 
Needless to say , a great deal of work remains to be 
done before we have a satisfactory explanation of  modern 
inflation . However , one thing is crystal clear : while a policy 
of fiscal restraint will certainly help to mitigate inflation , 
it cannot restore economic s tability . Quite as important is the 
necessity to promote competition . 
An even more fundamental result of a decline in rivalry 
is that it results in an economy in which a particular employment 
rate is associated with a higher inflation rate.  (Technically 
speaking , a decline in rivalry results in an upward shifting of  
the Phillips curve . )  To be sure , an economy with a high degree 
of rivalry will feature a good deal of short-term frictional 
unemployment , due to the fact that when some firms are experiencing 
"prosperity" others will be featuring "recession . "  Almost 
invariably, however,  industries with a high degree of  frictional 
unemployment will exhibit a rapid increase in total employment . 
Consider , for example , the automobile industry during the 1900s , 
the commercial aircraft industry during the 1930s , and the 
synthetic fibers industry after World War II . On the other hand , 
when there is so little rivalry in an industry it cannot compete 
with foreign firms or with other industries producing substitute 
products , employment opportunities are increased in other countries 
at the expense of an increasing degree of long-term unemployment 
in the country concerned . Consider , for example , the chronic 
92 
unemployment problems in the Scottish steel and textile indus tries ; 
or consider the fact that with 20 percent of U . S .  steel supplies 
now being imported from Japan , Youngstown and Pittsburgh are now 
facing chronic unemployment problems . 
Officials from the steel industry put the blame for low 
capacity utilization on the inability o f  steel companies to raise 
the capital to modernize their facilitie s .  But a t  the same time 
as their ability to compete in foreign markets was s teadily 
erroding , U . S .  steel firms were expanding into such fields as 
cement , railroads , o cean transport , seabed minerals , pipelines , 
oil-drilling equipment , titanium , and real estate ! This example 
provides a vivid illustration of the price the United States is 
paying for not having outlawed mergers years ago . Many of our 
political leaders do no t seem to understand that competition not 
only stimulates productivity gains , it is an important instrument 
in preserving an economy that does not require a huge amount of  
unemployment in order to  restrain inflation . 
However , the most impressive evidence of what is in 
store for the United State s ,  if better ways to promote competition 
cannot be found , is the relat ionship between unemployment and 
price changes during the 1975  downturn . At that time , industrial 
prices continued to rise although the unemployment rate rose to 
almost 8 percent o f  the total labor force . Moreover , long-term 
unemployment (unemployment of 15 weeks and over) rose from 16 
percent of  total unemployment in 1970 to 32  percent in 1975 , 
21 
and declined only to 29 percent in 197 7 . 
Actually, this experience is reminiscent of the Great 
93  
Depression , when the prices of many industrial commodities proved 
to be irresponsive to increases in the degree of uncertainty . To 
be sure , economists were unab le to explain such stickiness as 
a function of  concentration ratios . However , a high correlation 
between concentration ratios and a high degree of  feedback (as 
measured by changes in market shares) is no t to be expected . 
Thus , whereas the aircraft and steel industries were both highly 
concentrated industries , progress in reducing costs was more 
rapid in the first case than in the second . 
In conclusion : although this s tarted as a proj ect aimed 
at explaining the slowdown in productivity gains , it should be 
apparent that this subj ect simply canno t be studied in isolation 
of  what is happening in the economy as a whole . Thus , though the
hidden foot is the maj or factor in explaining the rate of pro­
ductivity gains , it performs other important functions as well . 
Indeed , if a dynamic economy is defined as an economy which , by 
virtue of having an e ffective hidden foot , can rapidly move 
alternatives away from the center o f  a distribution , then it 
should be apparent that the maj or advantage of dynamic capitalism 
over socialism is that dynamic capitalism has a superior ability 
to make economic progress .  On the other hand , a static capitalist 
economy that can generate only trivial differences between 
alternatives has no important advantage over socialism; and to 
his great credi t ,  Harold Hotelling was the first economist to 
recognize this fact of  life . 
Nevertheles s ,  it is ironic that those people who go 
the furthest to extol the virtues of dynamic capitalism are , 
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generally speaking , the people least willing to improve the 
effectiveness of competition . 
IV . RESTORING A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 
95 
It should be apparent from the previous discussion there is 
simply no way to return to the golden age of  1955-19 6 5  -- when President 
Kennedy complained that this country was not moving fast enough ! But 
it also should be clear that the price of waiting to take 
effective measures to restore competition can be very high . Not 
only is the productivity performance of the United S tates ' 
economy likely to worsen further , but we may witness sharper 
oscillations between inflation and recession . 
My first two recommendations for providing the economy 
with a higher degree o f  dynamic stability are both concerned with 
lowering the barriers to entry in activities in which new firms 
are sorely needed . The third recommendation is concerned with 
changing the antitrust regulations in a manner to make life in 
the well-established firms somewhat more challenging . 
1 .  The Need for New Firms in the Field of Automob ile Engines 
There can be no doubt that environmental regulations 
have greatly complicated the task of developing more efficient 
automobile engines by reducing fuel consumption . Developing 
automobile engines in terms of a double set of constraints is 
by no means an easy task . Nor can there be any doubt that a 
real need exists to move forward on both fronts s imultaneously . 
Reducing environmental degradation is quite as important a way 
to improve productivity as is reducing gasoline consumption . 
Indeed , if the GNP were correctly measured , it would include the 
benefits from reducing environmental degradation . 
On the other hand , it is also clear that the present 
form of environmental regulation has the effect of buying progress 
in the short-run by limiting the possibilities for more rapid 
progress in the longer-run . The essential reason that regulation 
has this effect is that it supplies perverse incentives for the 
generation of a diversity of alternatives . Firms are motivated 
to concentrate on the same technical approach , because so doing 
provides the best s trategy for getting the regulations relaxed . 
Thus , it is no accident that one of the best internal combustion 
engines available today , not only in terms of  its being a 
relatively clean engine that boasts somewhat high gas oline 
mileage and easy maintenance , is that developed by Honda . 
Curiously enough , our regulations supply better incentives to 
foreign car manufacturers than to American car manufacturers . 
What might be done to remove the disadvantage of the 
American automobile manufacturers? R&D contracts should be used 
as a means of establishing new firms to work on promising 
technological possibilities . There is certainly a precedent 
for such action -- during the 1920s military R&D contracts were 
used as a means for establishing firms to develop new types of 
aircraft engines . And , if it were politically possible to take 
such action when Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover were running 
this country , why is it not possible today? 
This is not to say , however , that automobile firms 
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should be discouraged from working on new types of engines . Quite 
obviously , the more competition , the greater the probability of  
making more rapid progress .  To be sure , if , as officials from 
the automobile companies argue , the industry is already operating 
at its peak dynamic capacity , no additional challenge is required . 
But in this case the automobile industry should be j ust as thank-
ful for technology developed on the outside as are computer 
companies . On the other hand , if the people in charge of engine 
development in the automob ile industry are correct in asserting 
that they could make more rapid progress were it no t for the 
constraints imposed on them by top management ,  then new entrants 
will make it easier for them to argue with their bosses . In 
either event , government actions to help establish new firms 
will make the automobile industry better off than it is today 
2 .  Decoupling the Generation of Electricity 
from Other Activities of  Public Utility Companies 
This proposal would , on the one hand , involve separation 
of generating electricity from the activities of transmitting and 
distributing electricity and , on the other , encouraging 
independent firms to compete in the generation of electricity on 
the basis of cos t .  To be sure , there are some outlying areas 
in which such competition would be precluded . But generally 
speakin g ,  the necessity of preserving scale economies cannot be 
given as a reason for not having such competition.  In fact , 
public ulilities commonly buy electricity from each other . 
The importance o f  such a decoupling stems from two 
factors . The first is that the incentives provided for searching 
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for low-cost alternatives are probably weaker than in any other 
industry in the entire economy . Not only is there little or no 
price rivalry between utility companies , but in normal times 
public utility rate-making procedures provide more or less the 
same incentives as cost-plus contracts . True , in times of  
inflation regulatory commissions are loath to pass on cost 
increases . However , in neither event can it be said that public 
utility commissions provide the same kind of feedback as would 
be provided by having independent companies compete on the basis 
of cost . If the United States and other countries had developed 
automobiles in the same manner that they are undertaking the 
development of  nuclear energy, the industry never would have 
evolved beyond steam cars costing about 25 , 000 dollars (in today ' s  
prices) . In terms o f  today ' s  perspective that , of course , might 
have been a fortunate outcome . However , the example bears out a 
somewhat less obvious point , to wit : if regulation ever does 
work , it will because of luck and luck alone . 
The second reason for the proposed decoupling is that 
when it comes to the development of exotic new technologies the 
public utilities are no more capable than the railroads would 
have been to develop airplanes . 
As a consequence of poor incentives and an almost 
zero ability on the part o f  public utilities to engage in dynamic 
behavior , the country has had to pay an exorbitant price for 
the development of  nuclear energy , both in terms of  cost and 
safety . To be sure , public utility companies cannot be blamed for 
all that has happened . They did not develop either the design 
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concepts or the detailed designs for the power plants .  Nor did 
they establish the safety regulations . However , the diffusion 
of  responsibility is in part a reflection of  the fact that the 
utility companies do not possess the required competence to play 
a significant role in the generation of new alternatives . 
Consider the very different s ituation in the field of  
commercial aircraft development . Just as safety requirements 
are imposed on nuclear power plants by a public agency , so are 
safety requirements imposed on commercial aircraft by a public 
agency . Moreover , the aircraft companies have no less of a 
s take in the safety of airliners than utility companies have had 
in the safety of power plants . Yet , the aircraft companies 
themselves have played an important role in the development of  
safe aircraft . For example , when the British Comet airplane 
developed serious problems , Boeing sent a team to Britain to 
help overcome these problems . Is it conceivable that nuclear 
power companies will ever develop the same competence to deal 
with their power plant safety problems ? 
Or to provide another example , when chemical companies 
build new plants , they too have them built by architectural­
engineering companies . Unlike nuclear power companies , chemical 
companies take complete responsibility for providing the design 
concepts . Moreover , when built , such p lants are operated by 
handpicked crews who , in turn , provide valuable feedback for the 
design of other new plant s .  But , again , is it conceivable that 
utility companies will ever acquire the competence to engage in 
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such behavior? 
This is not to suggest ,  however , that the United States 
government ought to build more nuclear p lants . My point is a 
general one : all new p lants for generating electricity should be 
operated by independent companies .  With respect to conventional 
power plants , utility companies ' incentives for discovering 
clever ways to cut costs always have been and still are very poor . 
The principal difference between the past and the present is that 
it is now more important to provide better incentives . Given 
this country ' s  predicament in generating an adequate rate of  
productivity gain , we no longer can afford the luxury of  making 
power costs even 15 to 20 percent higher than they need b e .  On 
the other hand , when in the next decade or two it becomes 
possible to deliver solar energy into a central grid , its 
economical development will also be seriously j eopardized if 
trusted to the same kinds of  incentives and an almost complete 
inability to deal with new circumstances . 
3 .  Putting a Hidden Foot into the Antitrust Laws 
If this country is ever to escape from stagflation , 
entrepreneurs represent an indispensable asset . But , while the 
United States possesses quite as many entrepreneurs as it ever did , 
this scarce resource is being squandered because its economy as 
a whole is becoming ensconced in a Hotelling equilibrium. There 
are , of course , a few industries in which the hidden foot continues 
to play an effective role . However , to the extent the hidden foot 
function is being performed , it is performed mainly by foreign 
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firms . 
Moreover , it should be apparent from the previous 
discussion that the maintenance of a Hotelling equilibrium 
requires no overt collusion . As we have seen , when business 
executives get to know each o ther very well , because the actions 
in which they engage are highly predictable , there is no necessity 
for them to collude in order to preserve the equilibrium . To be 
sure,  in Adam Smith ' s  world entrepreneurs in a particular trade 
were constantly fraternizing to conspire against the public at 
larg e .  However , that was long before the game of product 
differentiation had been discovered . Also keep in mind that this 
game is played so many times over that entrepreneurs have the 
opportunity to learn from their experiences . Consequently , the 
kind of  behavior envisioned in the prisoner ' s  dilemma response 
when a firm rushes to cut its prices to prevent its rival from 
striking first -- is ruled out , because if firms in an industry 
ever did engage in such behavior they would have learned their 
lesson . 
The problem , therefore , is how to change the antitrust 
laws in a manner that will discourage behavior resulting in trivial 
differences in prices and products and encourage the generation of  
a wider diversity o f  ideas . In other words , the problem is how to 
create better incentives for dynamic behavior . As matters stand 
today, the incentives provided by the antitrust laws are better 
calculated to minimize risks in the legal profession than they are 
to encourage risk-taking in the business world . This occurs 
because lawyers feel more at home with legal conspiracy theory 
than they do with economic theory . Hence , they tend to specialize 
in cases for which they are best prepared . Consequently , when 
business firms ask their legal councils in which kind o f  behavior 
they can engage without risking an antitrust suit , the normal 
answer is : "Be a little different , but do not collude . "  
Providing better incentives for competitive behavior 
requires changing the antitrust laws in a manner so firms seeking 
advice on antitrust matters will be told the following : ''We know 
that if you collude , you are in real danger . And we also know 
that the more your products and prices resemble those of your 
competitors , the greater is the danger of an antitrus t suit . But 
we cannot tell you how far you can go to be j ust a little bit 
differen t .  Just a s  Presidents have to operate within a broad 
band of uncertainty in predicting how far they can go before 
being accused o f  an impeachable o ffens e ,  so will you have to 
operate within a broad band o f  uncertainty . "  
How might the Antitrust Division o f  the Justice 
Department (or its successor) operate to provide the required 
incentives? First ,  let us as sume that if a concentrated industry 
as a whole fails to meet the tes t ,  its maj or firms will be broken 
up ; and , further , the reorganized firms will be required to 
select their new top managements from outside the industry in 
question. In other words , let us assume that the reorganization 
not only results in less concentration of economic power , but that 
it also results in bringing fresh thinking into the industry 
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concerned . To be sure , the government has no right to tell 
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firms what particular people should be selected for top management 
posit ions . But , inasmuch as a very narrow interpretation o f  
self-interest can j eopardize the public interest ,  the government 
does have a right to insist that when an industry ' s  dynamic 
performance is bad the firms look outside the industry for their 
new managements . 
The principal criterion employed in bringing dissolution 
suits will be a dynamic one , that is , whether the alternatives 
continue to remain in the middle of a dis tribution or whether they 
are being pushed out at a significant rate . However , j ust how 
slowly alternatives need move from the center before an industry 
is in the danger zone , firms will not know . Just as automobile 
drivers do not know how far they can go in exceeding the speed 
limi t ,  firms will not know at precisely what point they will enter 
the danger zone . In other words , the economis ts , engineers , and 
lawyers involved in bringing the cases will be given a certain 
amount of discretion on j ust where to draw the line . 
It can be expected that when industries move into the 
danger zone changes in market shares will tend to become smaller 
and smaller ; and the industry in question will experience greater 
and greater difficulties in meeting foreign competition . However , 
these are not infallable indicators . For example , quite signifi­
cant changes in market shares can occur because of advertising , 
competit ion in style , or by some newly discovered means o f  
competing in terms o f  fakery . The ability o f  American firms to 
meet foreign competition is not an infallible indicator , because 
many goods and services do not enter international competition . 
For example , housing does not -- and for that reason housing costs 
have risen enormously in nearly all countries . 
It is because s tatistical tests of competition are not 
infallible that engineers will have to play an indispensable role 
in the new or renamed "Department to Promote Competition . "  Quite 
obviously , neither economists nor lawyers possess the competence 
to distinguish between a minor and a significant change in an 
alternative , particularly when the change involves an improvement 
in quality . Competition in terms of price is , of course , 
relatively easy to measure . 
Finally , from the point of view o f  fairness ,  the enabling 
legislation should contain two provisions . In the first place , 
in order to provide firms with the opportunity to adj ust to the 
new law to promote competition (the new law to replace the Sherman 
Antitrust Act) , a three year period will be allowed to elapse 
before any case is tried under the new Act .  In the second place , 
because constraints on productivity gains imposed by labor unions 
can have more or less the same effect as a decline in rivalry 
(again, the field of housing provides a good illustration) , the 
imposition o f  such constraints ,  when they cannot be j ustified for 
safety reasons , shall be regarded as reason for dissolution of 
the union and the selection of new labor union leaders . How-
ever , the government should not try to control wages , whether 
by wage-price guidelines or direct contro ls . Wages should be 
determined by the workings of the market .  Under the new plan 
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to promote competition labor union leaders , too , will face real 
risks : if prices increase because of wage escalation they will 
risk unemployment ;  either that or maj or firms in the industry will 
risk dissolution . 
The major purpose o f  this proposal is two fold : (1) , to 
promote a higher rate o f  productivity growth by providing better 
incentives for risk-taking ; and (2) , to discourage wage increases 
from becoming more rapid than productivity gains by providing 
firms with better incentives than they have today for resisting 
wage increases . To be sur e ,  this will increase the possibility 
of  labor union s trikes . But this is an almost inevitable price
if the United States is to have more competition and a greater 
degree of price stability . 
I recognize , of course ,  that at first glance this may 
seem to be a somewhat radical proposal . However , it really is 
not . In the first place , in the antitrust action against the 
tobacco industry , when it engaged in parallel actions with respect 
to products and prices during the 1930s , the maj or firms in the 
industry were found to be engaging in anti-competitive behavior 
even though there was no direct evidence of collusion . Apparently 
in the aftermath of the Great Depression lawyers were more willing 
to take risks . However , today the same type of industry behavior 
is no less excusable than it was during the Great Depression . 
Secondly , I do not go nearly as far as Kaysen and Turner 
did in their pathbreaking book on antitrust by way of suggesting 
a wholesale breaking up o f  firms throughout American industry .2 2
I agree with their views with respect to the importance of limiting 
the concentration of economic and political power . And I am not 
concerned about possible losses in static efficiency , because 
they would be by far offset by gains in dynamic efficiency . How­
ever , I feel that under current conditions (as contrasted with the 
conditions in the 1950s as of the time they wrote their book) a 
very strong case can be made for undertaking dissolutions in a 
manner that will improve incentives for competitive behavior . 
Competition and Democracy: Although generating a more rapid 
rate of productivity gain and restraining inflation are important 
obj ectives in themselves , there is an even more basic reason for 
promoting a dynamic competitive society : it is an important 
adjunct for promoting Thomas Jefferson ' s  concept of democracy . 
Although there is no generally agreed upon definition of 
Jeffersonian democracy , those who are familiar with his letters 
to Madison will agree that the following does not widely miss the 
mark : a democratic society -is one that by virtue of generating 
a wide diversity of ideas can adapt itself to new circumstances . 
To be sure , I have been unable to find precisely such a statement 
in Jefferson ' s  writings ; but both his actions and his statements 
showed him to favor a society that could generate a wide diversity 
of ideas . Moreover , Jefferson certainly yearned for a society 
that could adapt to new circumstances : witness his plea for 
a small revolution every 20 years and what after all is the 
purpose of such a revolution than to put a hidden foot into 
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politics? Actually in their actions before the Revolutionary War , 
the British did put a hidden foot into politics ; and the ideo­
logical revolution which preceded did generate a wide diversity 
of ideas . And if it did so , why not , then , have a small revolution 
every twenty years? 
A dynamic competitive society complements Jefferson ' s  
concept o f  democracy , because highly interactive firms , in which 
people assume that they do not know all the answers , provide 
excellent training grounds for preserving a democratic society. 
Conversely , the highly authoritanian nature of cartelized firms 
in prewar Germany , primarily staffed with "yes-men , "  hardly 
provided an ideal training ground for the blossoming of democracy 
and the same was no doubt true in Japan before World War II . 
Moreover , both the Japanese and the Germans seem to be far more 
aware than we of the relationship between political democracy and 
democracy at the level of the firm. 
Or to consider another example , Bruce Cain , a political 
scientist at Caltech , has been working on a study of electoral 
volatility in Britain. 
23 He has found that the British political 
system has an amazing inability to deal with new circumstances . 
Entirely new issues such as devolution and immigration do arise . 
But the political candidates and the party bureaucracies remain 
almost as predictable as the planets . It is , of course ,  impossible 
to know which is the cause and which the effect : the economic 
system or the political system . The arrows of causation run 
both ways . Thus , highly bureaucratic labor organizations and 
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business bureaucracies , or highly bureaucratic party organizations 
modeled in their image , provide the training ground for members 
of Parliament . And by thinking that one of these highly pre-
dictable bureaucratic bodies is the only way of life , members of 
Parliament mold the economy in the same image . 
However , according to the writings of another Caltech 
political scientist ,  Morris Fiorina , American politics in its 
static orientation seems to be a full step ahead of British 
politics , because by dispensing favors to both individuals and 
interest groups Tammany Hall has in effect moved to Washington . 
Moreover , Fiorina has found that congressmen , in order to increase 
the effectiveness of their operations , have been building up the 
staffs of their home offices at a very impressive rate . More-
over , as he points out in some detail , by making entry more 
difficult these practices , in turn, have greatly contributed to 
a decline in political competition as measured by the longer and 
24 
longer periods congressmen tend to remain in office . 
In short , a principal difference between the behavior 
of the congressional and business establishments at the present 
time and that of the 1920s , at which time Hotelling wrote his 
famous article , is that now both establishments go much further to 
immunize themselves from feedback by undertaking a high degree 
of "product differentiation . "  
The more basic reason for the similarity in behavior is 
that both are responding to short-run incentives . How might 
congressional incentives be changed? This can be accomplished 
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by limiting congressional tenure , as well as presidential tenure , 
to maximum periods of six years . This would change congressional 
incentives , because when in office politicians would think less 
about "what can .I do to please this or that voter , "  and more about 
"how would I like to be remembered for what I did for my country? " 
Moreover , j ust as the business establishment could generate a wider 
diversity of ideas when the cost of entry is relatively low, so 
could the congressional establishment ; in particular , with better 
incentives a wider diversity of people would run for office.  In 
turn , a wider diversity of ideas would provide the country with 
a higher degree of congressional productivity . And a higher 
degree of congressional productivity would result in a higher 
degree of Jeffersonian democracy . Why should a country . wait for 
twenty years to have a political revolution? Why not ,  instead , 
have a country that is more or less continuously able to adapt 
itself to new circumstances? 
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J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 & 
J U N E  2 0 , l 9 7S 
J U N E  2 0 , 1 97 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8 
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
111 
1 .  < D P / O T > =  1 . 9  < DlJ/ D T >  6 . S  
2 .  < DP / O T > =  3 . 1  < OW/ O T >  7 . 2  
3 .  < D P/OT > =  2 . 3  < OW/OT> 7 . 4  
4 .  < DP / O T > =  2 . 5  < DlJ/DT> 7 . 7  
5 .  < DP / O T > =  2 . 6  < DW/D T >  6 . 3  
6 .  < DP / O T > =  2 . 4  < DlJ/D T >  7 . 4  
7 . < DP/OT > =  2 . 1  < DW/DT> 7 . 1  
8 .  < DP/OT > =  2 . 5  < OW/ O T >  6 . 4  
9 .  < DP / O T > =  2 . 4  < OW/OT> 6 . 4  
l 0 . < DP / O T > =  2 . 0 <OW/OT> 6 . 0
1 1 .  < DP/OT>= 2 .  0 < DW/DT> 6 . 8  
1 2 .  < DP/OT > =  1 . 9  <DW/DT> 7 . 7  
1 3 .  < DP/DT > =  2 . 2  <DW/DT> 6 . 3
1 4 . < DP/DT > =  2 . 0  < OW/OT> 6 . 0  
1 5 .  < D P / O T > =  2 . 3  < DIJ/D T >  7 . 1  
l .  < DP/OT > =  2 . 6 <DW/ D T > =  5 . 9  
2 .  < DP / O T > =  2 . 4  < DlJ/ D T > =  5 . 4  
3 .  < DP/OT > =  2 . 7  < DIJ/ D T > =  7 . 4  
4 .  < DP / D T > =  2 . 7  <OW/ O T > =  7 . 5  
5 .  < DP/ O T > =  3 . 1  < OW/OT > =  6 . 8  
6 .  < D P / D T > =  2 . 2  <DW/DT >= 6 . 4  
7 .  < D P / D T > =  2 . 1  <DIJ/ D T > =  5 . 7  
8 .  < D P / DT > =  3 . 0  <DW/ D T > =  5 . 7  
9 .  < DP / D T > =  3 . 1  <DIJ/ D T > =  5 . S  
l 0 .  < DP/OT > =  2 . 4 < DW/ D T > =  4 . 8  
1 1 . <DP/DT > =  2 . 4  < OW/OT>= 5 . 6  
1 2 .  < DP / O T > =  2 . 1  < OW/O T > =  5 . 8  
1 3 .  < D P/DT>= 2 . 7  < DW/DT>= 5 . 7  
1 4 .  < DP/DT > =  2 . 1  <DW/ D T > =  5 . 8  
1 5 .  < DP / O T > =  2 . 6  <DW/DT > =  5 . 6  
l .  < DP/OT > =  2 . 6 <DIJ/ D T > =  5 . 4  
2 .  < DP/DT > =  2 . 1  <DW/ D T > =  4 . 7  
3 .  <DP/DT > =  2 . 4  <DW/ D T > =  5 . 9  
4 .  < DP / DT > =  2 . 4  <DlJ/ D T > =  5 .  9 
5 .  < DP/OT > =  2 . 9  < DIJ/DT > =  4 . 9
6 .  < DP/OT > =  3 . 0  <OW/ O T > =  6 . 1  
7 .  <DP/DT > =  3 . 1  < DW/ D T > =  6 . 7  
8 .  < D P/DT>= 2 . 8  <DIJ/ DT > =  5 . 2  
9 .  < D P/DT>= 2 . 8  < DW/DT>= 5 . 2  
1 0 .  < D P / O T > =  2 . 8  <OW/ O T > =  5 . 0 
1 1 .  < DP/DT > =  2 . 0  < DW/DT>= 4 . 5  
1 2 .  < DP / O T > =  2 . 0  < D:.J/DT>= 4 . 5  
1 3 .  < D P / O T > =  3 . 1  < DW/ DT > r. . 5 . 2  
FIGURE XX 
MEDIUM D/DT PRODUCTIVITY INDUSTRY LISTING 
(ORDERED BY EMPLOYMENT , GROUPED BY < D$ /DT > ) 
< 0$ / D T > =  3 . S  3 3 0 0  P R I MARY M E T A L  I N D US T R I ES 
< 0 $/DT > =  4 . 0  24 0 0  L UM R E R  A H O  W O O D  P R O DU C T S  L ES S  2 4 3 1 , 3 4 P L U S  3 7 9 2  
< 0 $/DT > =  4 . 5  2 4 2 0  S AW� I L L S  A N D  P L A N I N G  M I L L S  
< 0 $/DT > =  4 . 6  2 4 2 1  S AWMI L L S  A N D  P L A N I N G  M I L L S ,  G E N E R A L  
< 0$/DT > =  3 . 8  3 3 5 0  N O N F E R R O U S  R O L L I N G  A N D  D R A W I N G  
< 0 $ / D T > =  3 . 9  3 3 2 1  GRAY I R O N  FOUNDR I ES 
< 0 $/DT > =  4 . 1  3 5 3 1  C O N S T R U C T I O N  MA C H I N ERY 
< 0 $ / D T > =  4 . 7  2 0 6 0  S U GAR A H O  C O N F EC T I O N ERY P R O D U C T S  
< 0 $ / D T > =  3 . 8  2 4 9 0  M I S C E L L A N E O U S  W O O D  P R O D U C T S  P L U S  2 4 4 8  
< O S / O T > =  3 . 9 3 3 5 7  N O N F E R R O U S  W I R E  DRAW I N G  & I N S U L A T I N G
< D$ / D T > =  3 . S  3 4 1 1  M E T A L  C A N S  
< D $/ D T > =  4 . 5  3 3 3 0  PR IMARY N O N F E R R O U S  M E T A L S  
< 0$ / DT > =  3 . 9  2 0 1 3  S A U S A G E S  A N D  O T H ER P R E P A R E D  M E A T S  
< D $/DT > =  4 . 7  3 3 5 1  C O P P ER R O L L I N G A N D  DRAW I N G  
< D$/DT > =  4 . 9  2 0 22 C H E ES E ,  N A T U R A L  A N D  P R O C ES S E D  
<0$/D T > =  3 . 0  3 5 0 0  MACH I N ERY , EXC E P T  E L EC T R I C A L  
< D S/ D T > =  2 . 2  2 3 0 0 A P P A R E L A N D  O T H ER T EXT I L E  P R O D U C T S  
< O S / O T > =  2 . 3  3 7 1 0  M O T O R  V E H I C L ES A N D  EQUI PMENT 
< DS/DT > =  2 . 3  3 7 1 1  M O T O R  V EH I C L E S ,  CAR B O D I ES & P A R T S  C 3 7 1 1 , 1 4 )
< D S / D T > =  3 . 0  3 7 2 0  A I R C R A F T  A N D  P A R T S  P L US 3 7 6 4 , 3 7 6 9  
< D S / D T > =  3 . 0  3 2 0 0 S T O N E ,  C L AY ;  A N D  G L A S S  P R O D U C T S  
< D$ / DT > =  3 . 0  2 5 0 0 F U R N I T U R E  A N D  FIXTURES P L U S  2 4 3 1 , 3 4 
< O S / O T > =  1 . 9 3 6 6 0  COMMU N I C A T I O N  E Q U I P M E N T  
< O S / O T > =  2 . 5  3 9 0 0  M I S C E L L A N EO U S  MAHU FACT U R I H G  I N DU S T R I ES 
< D$ / D T > =  1 . 9  2 3 3 0  WOMENS A N D  M I S S ES O U T ERWEAR 
<DS/DT>= 3 . 3  3 4 4 0  F A B R I C A T E D  S T R U C T U R A L  M E T A L  P R O D U C T S  
< D S / D T > =  3 . 3  2 7 5 0  COMMER C I A L  P R I N T I N G  P L U S  2 7 9 5  
< D S / D T > =  2 . 4  2 3 2 0  M E N S  A H O  BOYS FUR N I S H I N G S  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
< 0$/DT > =  3 . 3  2 7 5 2  C O M L  P R T G - L E T T E RP R , L I T H , GR AV , L I T H P L A T E C 27 5 1 , 5 2 , 5 4 , 9 5 )  0 
< 0 $ / D T > =  3 . 5  2 0 1 0  M E A T  P R O DU C T S  0 
< 0 $ / D T >  1 .  7 3 6 6 2  R A D I O  A N D  TV COMMU N I C A T I O N  E Q U I P M E N T  0 
< DS/DT> l .  7 2 3 3 5  WOMEN ' S  A H D  M I S S E S ' D R E S S E S  0 
< D$/DT> 1 . 2  2 2 2 0 WEAV I N G  M I L L S .  SYN T H E T I CS 0 
< O S/OT> 1 . 2  2 2 2 1  W E A V I N G  M I L L S ,  SY N T H ET I CS 0 
< O S/OT> 1 . 1  3 1 7 1  WOMEN ' S  H A N D B A G S  A N D  P U R S E S  0 
< 0 $ / D T >  0 . 7  2 2 8 3  W O O L  Y A R N  MI L L S  0 
< D $/DT> l .  7 3 2 7 5  GY P S U M  P R O D U C T S  0 
< D S/DT> 0 . 8  2 3 7 0  FUR G O O D S  0 
< DS / D T >  o . s 2 3 7 1  FUR G O O D S  0 
< D $/DT> l .  7 3 4 2 5  H A N D  S AWS A N D  SAW B L A D E S  0 
< D S/DT> 0 . 8  3 0 3 0  R E C L A IMED R U B B E R  0 
< DS/DT> 0 . 8 3 0 3 1  R E C L A IMED R U B B ER Q 
< 0$ / D T >  1 . 5  2 4 5 1  M O B I L E  HOMES , T RA I L ERS & CAMPERS C 2 4 5 1 , 37 9 2 )  M Q l 
Source : Bureau of Labor Statistics . 
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J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
JUl':E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
J U N E  2 0 ,  1 9 7 8
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
JUNE  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 ,  1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
J U �I E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
JUNE 2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
JUNE 2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U H E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
J U tl E  2 0 . 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U H E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
JUNE  2 0 , 1 9 78
JUNE 2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
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FIGURE XXI 
HIGH D/DT PRODUCTIVITY INDUSTRY LISTING 
(ORDERED BE EMPLOYMENT , GROUPED BY < D$ /DT > ) 
1 . < DP/OT> 4 . 4  < DW/ DT> 6 . 3  < 0$/DT>= 5 . 1  2 9 0 0  P E T R O L EUM AND C O A L  P R O D U C T S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
2 .  < DP/DT> 5 . 0  < DW/ DT> 6 . 6  < D S /DT > =  4,. 0 2 0 8 6  BO T T L ED A N D  C A N N E D  S O FT D R I N K S  0 J U N E  2 0 ,  1 9 7 8  
3 .  <DP/DT> 5 . 0  < DW/DT> 6 . 6  <0$/DT>= 5 . 3  2 9 1 1  P E T R O L EUM R E F I N I N G  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78
4 .  < DP/DT> 5 . 0  < DW/ DT> 6 . 6  < DS/DT>= 5 . 3  2 9 1 0  P E T R O L EUM R E F I N I N G  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
5 .  <DP/DT> 3 . 3  < DW/ DT> 9 . 3  < D S/DT > =  4 . 7  2 4 1 0 L O GGI N G  CAMPS & L O G G I N G  C O N T R A C T O R S 0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
6 .  < DP/DT> 3 . 3  < DW/DT> 9 . 3  < D $/DT>= 4 . 7  2 4 1 1  L O G G I N G  CAMPS & L O G G I N G  C O N T R A C T O RS 0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8
7 .  <DP/DT> 4 . 0  < DW/ DT> 6 . 5 < D$/DT>= 4 . 5  2 0 7 0  F A T S  A N D  O I L S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
8 .  <DP/OT> 3 . 4  <DW/DT> 7 . 2  < 0$/DT>= 5 . 2  2 6 1 0  P U L P  M I L L S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
9 .  <DP/DT> 3 . 4  < DW/DT> 7 . 2  < D$/DT>= 5 . 2  2 6 1 1  P U L P  M I L L S  ' 0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
1 0 .  < DP/OT> 4 . 1  <DW/DT> 7 . 2  < D$/DT>= 5 . 0  2 0 7 7  A N I M A L  A N D  MA R I N E  FATS A N D  O I L S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
1 1 .  <DP/OT> 4 . 6  < DW/DT> 7 . 7  < D $/DT>= 5 . 0  2 0 4 6  W E T  C O R N  M I L L I N G  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
1 2 .  < DP/DT> 3 . 8  <DW/DT> 8 . 5  <0$/DT>= 4 . 6  2 0 4 4  R I C E  M I L L I N G  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
1 3 .  < DP/DT> 7 . 2  < OW/OT> 7 . 9  < DS / D T > =  4 . 7  2 9 9 9  P ET R O L EUM A N D  C O A L  P R O D U C T S ,  N E C  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
1 .  < DP/OT>= 3 . 2  < OW/O T > =  6 . 7  <DS/DT>= 2 . 6  3 7 0 0  T R A N S P O R T A T I O N  E Q U I PMENT L ES S  3 7 9 2  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
2 .  < DP/OT> = 3 . 3  <DW/DT>= 6 . 2  < D S / D T > =  3 . 5  2 0 0 0  FOOD A N D  K I N D R E D  P R O D U C T S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
3 .  < DP/OT>= 4 . 4  <DW/DT>= 6 . 2  < D $/DT>= 2 . 0  28 0 0  C H EMI C A L S  A N D  A L L I ED P R O D U C T S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 97 8  
4 .  < D P/OT>= 3 . 5  < OW/OT>= 6 . 6  < 0$/0T>= 2 . 9  26 0 0  P A P E R  AND A L L I ED PRODUCTS 0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
5 .  <DP/OT>= 4 . 0  < DW/ DT>= 5 . 7  < 0$ / D T > =  2 . 3  38 0 0  I N S T R UMENTS A N D  R E L A T E D  P RO DUCTS 0 J U N E  2 0 . 1 9 7 8  
6 .  < DP/OT > =  3 . 9 < DW/ D T > =  7 . 1  < 0$/DT>= 2 . 7  3 7 2 1  A I R C R A F T  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
7 .  < DP/OT>= 4 . 8 < DlJ/ DT>= 6 .  0 <0$/0T>= 3 . 2  2 0 2 0  D A I RY P R O D UCTS 0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
8 .  <DP/ O T > =  5 . 5  <DW/ D T > =  6 . 2  < 0$/DT>= 2 . 6  2 0 8 0  B E V ERAGES 0 J U N E  2 0 . 1 97 8  
9 .  < DP/OT>= 3 . 5  <OW/ OT>= 6 . 5  < 0$/DT>= 2 . 5  2 6 5 0  P A P ER B O A R D  C O N T A I N E R S  A N D  B OX E S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
1 0 .  < OP/OT>= 3 . 7  <DW/DT>= 5 . 9  < 0 $/DT>= 3 . 5  2 0 1 1  MEAT P A C K I N G  P L A N T S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
1 1. < DP/OT>= 3 . 9  <DW/D T > =  6 . 8 < OS/OT>= 1 . 8  2 3 9 0  M I S C . FA B R I CA T E D  T E XT I L E  P R O D U C T S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
1 2 .  < DP/DT>= 5 . 3  < DW/ D T > =  5 . 8  < 0$/DT>= 2 . 8  2 0 2 6  F L U I D  M I L K  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
1 3 .  < OP/OT>= 3 . 5  < OW/OT>= 7 . 0  < D $/DT>= 3 . 3  2 6 2 1  P A P E R  M I L L S ,  EXC B U I L D I N G  P A P E R  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
1 4 .  < DP/OT>= 3 . 5 <DW/ D T > =  7 . 0 < D $ / D T > =  3 . 3 2 6 2 0  P A P E R  M I L S ,  EXC EP T  B U I L D I N G  P A P E R  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
1 5 .  <DP/DT>= 5 . 4  <DW/ D T > =  6 . 2 <D$/DT>= 2 . 2  2 8 6 0 I N DU S T R I A L  O R GA N I C  CH EMI C A L S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
1 .  < DP/DT>= 3 . 7  <DW/ D T > =  5 . 6  < 0$/DT>= 1 . 5  3 6 0 0  E L ECT R I C  AND E L ECT R O N I C  E Q U I PMENT 0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
2 .  < DP/DT>= 3 . 8  < DW/ D T > =  6 . 0 < 0 $/DT>= l .  8 2 2 0 0  T EXT I L E  M I L L  P R O D U C T S  0 J U N E  2 0 ,  1 9 7 8  
3 .  < DP/DT> = 6 . 8  <DW/ D T > =  6 . 6 < D $/DT>=- 0 . 3  3 6 7 0  E L E C T R O N I C  COMP O N E N T S  A N D  ACCES S OR I ES 0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
4 .  < DP/OT>= 7 . 6 <DW/ D T > =  6 . 8  < 0$/DT>=- 1 . 0  3 6 7 9  S EM I C O N DUCTRS & E L EC COMP ON ENTS ( 36 7 4 , 7 5 , 7 6 , 7 7 , 7 8 , 7 9 )  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
5 .  <DP/OT>= 6 . 3 <DW/DT> = 6 . 2  < 0 $ / D T > =  0 . 4 2 2 5 0  K N I T T I N G M I L L S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
6 .  < DP/DT>= 5 . 4  < DW/DT>= 6 . 0  < 0$/DT>= 0 . 6  3 5 7 0  O F F I C E  A N D  COMP U T I N G  MACH I N ES 0 J U tl E 2 0 , 1 9 78 
7 .  < DP/OT>= 4 . 0  < DW/ D T > =  4 . 1  <D$/DT>= 0 . 8 3 6 3 0  H O U S E H O L D  AP P L I AN C ES 0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
8 .  < DP/OT>= 5 . 1  < DW/ D T > =  5 . 5  < 0$/DT>= 0 . 1 3 5 7 3  E L ECT R O N I C  COMPTG E Q U I P  & C A L C  MA C H I N ES C 35 7 3 , 7 4 ) 0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
9 .  < DP/OT>= 3 . 4  < DW/ D T > =  6 . 2 < D S / D T > =  1 . 6 228 0 YARN A N D  T H R E A D  M I L L S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
1 0 .  <DP/OT > =  5 . 0  < DW/ D T > =  6 . 3  < 0 $/DT>= 0 . 4  2 8 3 0  DRUGS 0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
1 1 .  < DP/OT>= 8 . 0  < DW/DT > =  6 . 0 < DS / D T > =- 1 . 3  3 6 5 0  RA D I O  A N D  T V  R E C E I V I N G  E Q U I PM EN T  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
1 2 . <DP/OT>= 5 . 0  <DW/ D T > =  6 . 4  < DS/DT>= 0 . 5  2834 P H A RMAC E U T I C A L  P R EPARA T I O N S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
1 3 . <DP/OT>= 5 . 6  <DW/DT>= 6 . 1  < OS/OT>= 1 .  8 286 9 I N D U S T R I A L  ORGA N I C  CH EMI CA L S ,  N E C  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 78 
1 4 .  < DP/OT>= 7 . 3  < D:J/ D T > =  6 . 0  < D S/OT>=- 0 . 5  2 2 5 1  H O S I ERY C 22 5 1 , 5 2 )  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
1 5 .  <DP/DT>= 9 . 1  < DW/D.T>= 6 . 3  <DS/DT>=-1 . 7  3 6 5 1  R A D I O  A N D  T V  R E C E I V I N G  S ET S  0 J U N E  2 0 , 1 9 7 8  
Source : Bureau of Labor S tatistics . 
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